鮑威爾在2023年杰克遜霍爾會議上的演講全文（中英對照）

　　智堡

　　要點：1、2%依然是也仍將是我們的通脹目標。2、我們準備在適當的情況下進一步提高利率，并打算將政策利率維持在一個限制性水平。

　　Good morning． At last year‘s Jackson Hole symposium， I delivered a brief， direct message． My remarks this year will be a bit longer， but the message is the same： It is the Fed’s job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal， and we will do so．

　　早上好。在去年的杰克遜霍爾研討會上，我曾發表了一個簡短而直接的講話。我今年的演講將稍長一些，但要傳達的信息是一樣的：將通脹降至2%的目標是美聯儲的職責，我們將致力于實現這一點。

　　We have tightened policy significantly over the past year． Although inflation has moved down from its peak—a welcome development—it remains too high． We are prepared to raise rates further if appropriate， and intend to hold policy at a restrictive level until we are confident that inflation is moving sustainably down toward our objective．

　　在過去的一年里，我們極大地收緊了貨幣政策。盡管通脹率已經從最高點回落——這是一個可喜的發展——但仍然過高。我們準備在適當的情況下進一步提高利率，并打算將政策利率維持在一個限制性水平，直到我們確信通脹正在朝著我們的目標持續下降。

　　Today I will review our progress so far and discuss the outlook and the uncertainties we face as we pursue our dual mandate goals． I will conclude with a summary of what this means for policy． Given how far we have come， at upcoming meetings we are in a position to proceed carefully as we assess the incoming data and the evolving outlook and risks．

　　今天，我將回顧我們迄今為止所取得的進展，并討論我們在追求雙重使命時所面臨的前景和不確定性。最后，我將總結一下這對政策意味著什么。考慮到我們已經取得的進展，在即將召開的會議上，我們能夠在評估新進數據以及不斷變化的前景和風險時謹慎行事。

　　迄今為止的通脹進展

　　The ongoing episode of high inflation initially emerged from a collision between very strong demand and pandemic-constrained supply． By the time the Federal Open Market Committee raised the policy rate in March 2022， it was clear that bringing down inflation would depend on both the unwinding of the unprecedented pandemic-related demand and supply distortions and on our tightening of monetary policy， which would slow the growth of aggregate demand， allowing supply time to catch up． While these two forces are now working together to bring down inflation， the process still has a long way to go， even with the more favorable recent readings．

　　持續的高通脹最初是由異常強勁的需求與受疫情限制的供給相撞應運而生的。截止2022年3月聯邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）提高政策利率之時，很明顯，降低通脹既取決于消除與疫情相關的前所未有的需求和供給扭曲，也取決于我們收緊貨幣政策，因為這將減緩總需求的增長，使供給有時間迎頭趕上。雖然這兩股力量目前正在共同努力降低通脹，但這一過程仍有很長的路要走，即使最近的數據頗為有利。

　　On a 12-month basis， U.S． total， or “headline，” PCE （personal consumption expenditures） inflation peaked at 7 percent in June 2022 and declined to 3.3 percent as of July， following a trajectory roughly in line with global trends （figure 1， panel A）． The effects of Russia‘s war against Ukraine have been a primary driver of the changes in headline inflation around the world since early 2022． Headline inflation is what households and businesses experience most directly， so this decline is very good news． But food and energy prices are influenced by global factors that remain volatile， and can provide a misleading signal of where inflation is headed． In my remaining comments， I will focus on core PCE inflation， which omits the food and energy components．

　　同比來看，美國總體個人消費支出（PCE）通脹率在2022年6月達到7%的峰值，并在今年7月降至3.3%，大致與全球趨勢一致（圖1，面板A）。自2022年初以來，俄烏沖突的影響一直是全球總體通脹變化的主要驅動因素。總體通脹是家庭和企業最能直接感受到的，因此這一降幅是個非常好的消息。但食品和能源價格受到全球因素的影響，而這些因素仍不穩定，并可能會對通脹走向發出誤導性信號。在我剩下的演講中，我將重點關注核心PCE通脹，其中剔除了食品和能源部分。

　　On a 12-month basis， core PCE inflation peaked at 5.4 percent in February 2022 and declined gradually to 4.3 percent in July （figure 1， panel B）． The lower monthly readings for core inflation in June and July were welcome， but two months of good data are only the beginning of what it will take to build confidence that inflation is moving down sustainably toward our goal． We can‘t yet know the extent to which these lower readings will continue or where underlying inflation will settle over coming quarters． Twelve-month core inflation is still elevated， and there is substantial further ground to cover to get back to price stability．

　　同比來看，核心PCE通脹率在2022年2月達到5.4%的峰值，并在今年7月逐漸下降至4.3%（圖1，面板B）。6月和7月的月度核心通脹數據較低無疑是受歡迎的，但這兩個月的好數據只是建立對通脹向目標持續下行信心的開始。我們還不知道這些較低的數據會持續到什么程度，也不知道未來幾個季度潛在的通脹會在哪里穩定下來。12個月（同比）核心通脹率仍處于高位，要恢復物價穩定還有相當長的路要走。

　　To understand the factors that will likely drive further progress， it is useful to separately examine the three broad components of core PCE inflation—inflation for goods， for housing services， and for all other services， sometimes referred to as nonhousing services （figure 2）．

　　為了理解可能推動通脹進一步發展的因素，我們有必要分別考察核心PCE通脹的三個主要組成部分——商品通脹、住房服務通脹和所有其他服務通脹，有時被稱為非住房服務業（圖2）。

　　Core goods inflation has fallen sharply， particularly for durable goods， as both tighter monetary policy and the slow unwinding of supply and demand dislocations are bringing it down． The motor vehicle sector provides a good illustration． Earlier in the pandemic， demand for vehicles rose sharply， supported by low interest rates， fiscal transfers， curtailed spending on in-person services， and shifts in preference away from using public transportation and from living in cities． But because of a shortage of semiconductors， vehicle supply actually fell． Vehicle prices spiked， and a large pool of pent-up demand emerged． As the pandemic and its effects have waned， production and inventories have grown， and supply has improved． At the same time， higher interest rates have weighed on demand． Interest rates on auto loans have nearly doubled since early last year， and customers report feeling the effect of higher rates on affordability． On net， motor vehicle inflation has declined sharply because of the combined effects of these supply and demand factors．

　　核心商品（尤其是耐用品）通脹已大幅下降，因為貨幣政策收緊以及供需錯位的緩慢緩解正在拉低核心商品通脹。汽車分項就是一個很好的例子。在疫情早期，由于低利率、財政轉移支付、面對面服務支出減少，以及人們不再傾向于使用公共交通工具和居住在城市，對車輛的需求急劇上升。但由于半導體的短缺，汽車供給實際上下降了。因此，汽車價格飆升，大量被壓抑的需求開始出現。隨著疫情及其影響的減弱，生產和庫存有所增加，供給相應改善。與此同時，更高的利率也抑制了需求。自去年初以來，汽車貸款利率幾乎翻了一番。此外，消費者報告稱，利率上升對他們的負擔能力產生了影響。總的來說，由于這些供給和需求因素的綜合影響，機動車輛的通脹率急劇下降。

　　Similar dynamics are playing out for core goods inflation overall． As they do， the effects of monetary restraint should show through more fully over time． Core goods prices fell the past two months， but on a 12-month basis， core goods inflation remains well above its pre-pandemic level． Sustained progress is needed， and restrictive monetary policy is called for to achieve that progress．

　　整體上看，核心商品通脹也呈現出類似的態勢。隨著時間的推移，貨幣政策緊縮的效果應該會更充分地顯現出來。核心商品價格在過去兩個月有所下降，但同比增速仍遠高于大流行前的水平。持續的進展是必要的，為了實現這一進展，需要采取限制性貨幣政策。

　　In the highly interest-sensitive housing sector， the effects of monetary policy became apparent soon after liftoff． Mortgage rates doubled over the course of 2022， causing housing starts and sales to fall and house price growth to plummet． Growth in market rents soon peaked and then steadily declined （figure 3）．

　　在對利率高度敏感的房地產行業，貨幣政策的效果在加息不久之后就已顯現出來。在2022年期間，抵押貸款利率翻了一番，導致房屋開工率和銷售量下降，房價漲幅暴跌。市場租金的增長很快見頂，然后穩步下降（圖3）。

　　Measured housing services inflation lagged these changes， as is typical， but has recently begun to fall． This inflation metric reflects rents paid by all tenants， as well as estimates of the equivalent rents that could be earned from homes that are owner occupied.4 Because leases turn over slowly， it takes time for a decline in market rent growth to work its way into the overall inflation measure． The market rent slowdown has only recently begun to show through to that measure． The slowing growth in rents for new leases over roughly the past year can be thought of as “in the pipeline” and will affect measured housing services inflation over the coming year． Going forward， if market rent growth settles near pre-pandemic levels， housing services inflation should decline toward its pre-pandemic level as well． We will continue to watch the market rent data closely for a signal of the upside and downside risks to housing services inflation．

　　PCE指數所衡量的住房服務通脹滯后于這些市場變化，但最近也開始下降。這一通脹指標反映了所有租戶支付的租金，以及對自住房屋可能賺取的等效租金的估計。由于租約周轉緩慢，市場租金增速的下降需要一段時間才能影響到整體通脹指標。市場租金放緩直到最近才開始體現在這一指標上。過去一年左右的新租金增長放緩可以被視為“正在醞釀中”，并將影響未來一年的住房服務通脹。展望未來，如果市場租金增長穩定在疫情前的水平附近，住房服務通脹也應該下降到疫情前的水平。我們將繼續密切關注市場租金數據，以尋找住房服務通脹上行和下行風險的信號。

　　The final category， nonhousing services， accounts for over half of the core PCE index and includes a broad range of services， such as health care， food services， transportation， and accommodations． Twelve-month inflation in this sector has moved sideways since liftoff． Inflation measured over the past three and six months has declined， however， which is encouraging． Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods． Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive， and the labor market remains tight． Given the size of this sector， some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability． Over time， restrictive monetary policy will help bring aggregate supply and demand back into better balance， reducing inflationary pressures in this key sector．

　　最后一大類，即非住房服務，占核心PCE的一半以上，包括各類廣泛的服務業，如醫療保健，食品服務，交通和住宿。自加息以來，該分項的12個月（同比）通脹率一直在橫盤。不過，過去3個月和6個月的通脹率有所下降，這令人鼓舞。迄今為止，非住房服務通脹僅溫和下降的部分原因是，其中許多服務業受全球供應鏈瓶頸的影響較小，且通常被認為其對利率的敏感度并不像住房或耐用品一樣大。這些服務的生產也是相對勞動密集型的，勞動力市場目前仍然緊俏。鑒于這一大項的規模，在這方面取得進一步進展對于恢復價格穩定至關重要。隨著時間的推移，限制性貨幣政策將有助于使總供給和總需求恢復到更好的平衡狀態，減少這一關鍵分項的通脹壓力。

　　前景

　　Turning to the outlook， although further unwinding of pandemic-related distortions should continue to put some downward pressure on inflation， restrictive monetary policy will likely play an increasingly important role． Getting inflation sustainably back down to 2 percent is expected to require a period of below-trend economic growth as well as some softening in labor market conditions．

　　關于前景，雖然疫情相關的扭曲效應在逐漸消除的過程中將繼續對通脹施加下行壓力，但限制性的貨幣政策可能會發揮越來越重要的作用。預計需要經歷一段經濟增長低于趨勢增長的時期，而且需要勞動力市場狀況有所緩和，通脹才能持續地回落至2%。

　　經濟增長

　　Restrictive monetary policy has tightened financial conditions， supporting the expectation of below-trend growth． Since last year‘s symposium， the two-year real yield is up about 250 basis points， and longer-term real yields are higher as well—by nearly 150 basis points． Beyond changes in interest rates， bank lending standards have tightened， and loan growth has slowed sharply． Such a tightening of broad financial conditions typically contributes to a slowing in the growth of economic activity， and there is evidence of that in this cycle as well． For example， growth in industrial production has slowed， and the amount spent on residential investment has declined in each of the past five quarters （figure 4）．

　　限制性的貨幣政策收緊了金融狀況，以支持對低于趨勢增長的預期。自去年的杰克遜霍爾會議以來，兩年期實際收益率上漲了約250個基點，而較長期的實際收益率也上升了近150個基點。除了利率變化外，銀行的貸款標準有所收緊，貸款增長急速放緩。這種廣泛的金融狀況收緊通常會導致經濟活動的增長放緩，在本輪周期也有這類證據。例如，在過去的五個季度中，工業產出的增長已然放緩，住宅投資支出也在下降（圖4）。

　　But we are attentive to signs that the economy may not be cooling as expected． So far this year， GDP （gross domestic product） growth has come in above expectations and above its longer-run trend， and recent readings on consumer spending have been especially robust． In addition， after decelerating sharply over the past 18 months， the housing sector is showing signs of picking back up． Additional evidence of persistently above-trend growth could put further progress on inflation at risk and could warrant further tightening of monetary policy．

　　但我們正密切關注那些未反映經濟如期降溫的信號。今年迄今為止，GDP（國內生產總值）增長超出預期，也高于其長期趨勢，而且最近的消費支出數據尤為強勁。此外，地產行業在過去18個月里急速放緩之后正顯示出復蘇的跡象。持續高于趨勢增長的進一步證據可能會使通脹前景面臨風險，可能需要進一步收緊貨幣政策。

　　勞動力市場

　　The rebalancing of the labor market has continued over the past year but remains incomplete． Labor supply has improved， driven by stronger participation among workers aged 25 to 54 and by an increase in immigration back toward pre-pandemic levels． Indeed， the labor force participation rate of women in their prime working years reached an all-time high in June． Demand for labor has moderated as well． Job openings remain high but are trending lower． Payroll job growth has slowed significantly． Total hours worked has been flat over the past six months， and the average workweek has declined to the lower end of its pre-pandemic range， reflecting a gradual normalization in labor market conditions （figure 5）．

　　勞動力市場的再平衡在過去一年中持續進行，但仍未完成。勞動力供給有所改善，25-54歲的勞動力參與率有所增加，移民增速回升至疫情前水平。實際上，女性的壯齡勞動力參與率在6月達到了歷史最高水平。對勞動力的需求也有所減緩。雖然職位空缺水平仍然很高，但其趨勢在逐漸下降。就業崗位的增長已經顯著放緩。過去六個月總工時保持穩定，平均周工作時長已下降至疫情前的區間下沿，反映出勞動力市場狀況的逐漸正常化（圖5）。

　　This rebalancing has eased wage pressures． Wage growth across a range of measures continues to slow， albeit gradually （figure 6）． While nominal wage growth must ultimately slow to a rate that is consistent with 2 percent inflation， what matters for households is real wage growth． Even as nominal wage growth has slowed， real wage growth has been increasing as inflation has fallen．

　　這種再平衡減輕了工資壓力。從多個指標來看，工資增長仍在逐漸放緩（圖6）。雖然名義工資增長最終必須放緩到與2%的通脹一致的水平，但對于家庭來說真實的工資增長才更重要。盡管名義工資增長放緩，但隨著通脹下降，實際工資增長日益上升。

　　We expect this labor market rebalancing to continue． Evidence that the tightness in the labor market is no longer easing could also call for a monetary policy response．

　　我們預計這種勞動力市場的再平衡將繼續下去。如果證據表明勞動力市場的緊張狀況不再持續緩解，仍有可能需要貨幣政策作出反應。

　　前路漫漫：不確定性與風險管理

　　Uncertainty and Risk Management along the Path Forward

　　2%依然是也仍將是我們的通脹目標。我們致力于實現與維持足夠限制性的貨幣政策立場，以讓通脹隨著時間推移回到2%的水平。要實時判斷這樣的立場何時得以實現，當然極富挑戰性。這當中的一些挑戰，與歷史上的所有緊縮周期具有共性。例如，實際利率目前已經轉正，且遠高于中性政策利率（r*）的主流估算。我們認為當前的政策立場是限制性的，對經濟活動、勞工雇傭和通貨膨脹均施加了下行壓力。但我們沒有能力明確指出中性利率的水平，也因此貨幣政策約束的精確水平總是存在不確定性。

　　Two percent is and will remain our inflation target． We are committed to achieving and sustaining a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down to that level over time． It is challenging， of course， to know in real time when such a stance has been achieved． There are some challenges that are common to all tightening cycles． For example， real interest rates are now positive and well above mainstream estimates of the neutral policy rate． We see the current stance of policy as restrictive， putting downward pressure on economic activity， hiring， and inflation． But we cannot identify with certainty the neutral rate of interest， and thus there is always uncertainty about the precise level of monetary policy restraint．

　　由于貨幣緊縮影響經濟活動、尤其是通貨膨脹的時滯長度的不確定性，對政策立場限制性的評估被進一步復雜化。自一年前的杰克遜霍爾會議以來，FOMC提高政策利率已達300bps，過去七個月當中加息100bps。我們還大幅削減了美聯儲的證券持倉規模。對這些時滯效應的估算區間甚廣，也意味著進一步的顯著拖累可能仍在傳導當中。

　　That assessment is further complicated by uncertainty about the duration of the lags with which monetary tightening affects economic activity and especially inflation． Since the symposium a year ago， the Committee has raised the policy rate by 300 basis points， including 100 basis points over the past seven months． And we have substantially reduced the size of our securities holdings． The wide range of estimates of these lags suggests that there may be significant further drag in the pipeline．

　　在這些政策不確定性的傳統來源之外，本輪周期當中獨特的供需錯配通過其對通貨膨脹和勞動力市場動態的影響，為我們提出了更多難題。例如，截至目前，職位空缺已顯著下滑，卻沒有造成失業增加——這一結果當然廣受歡迎，但在歷史上卻是不尋常的，反映了對勞動力的嚴重過剩需求。此外，與過去數十年的經驗相比，有證據表明通貨膨脹對勞動力市場緊張的反應變得更加靈敏[8]。這些尚在變化中的動態也許會留存下來，也許不會，但不確定性本身強調了靈活政策制定的必要性。

　　[8] 勞動力市場松弛與通貨膨脹之間的關系——常被稱為菲利普斯曲線關系——可能是非線性的，在緊張的勞動力市場當中呈現陡峭化。如果菲利普斯曲線呈現這樣的陡峭化，勞動力市場緊張程度的一點細微變化，就可能引致通貨膨脹更為顯著的變化。要實時精確地判斷這種陡峭化的程度，或者伴隨勞動力市場緊張程度的變化它會如何演變，是非常困難的。

　　Beyond these traditional sources of policy uncertainty， the supply and demand dislocations unique to this cycle raise further complications through their effects on inflation and labor market dynamics． For example， so far， job openings have declined substantially without increasing unemployment—a highly welcome but historically unusual result that appears to reflect large excess demand for labor． In addition， there is evidence that inflation has become more responsive to labor market tightness than was the case in recent decades.8 These changing dynamics may or may not persist， and this uncertainty underscores the need for agile policymaking．

　　8． The relationship between labor market slack and inflation， often called the Phillips curve relationship， is likely nonlinear， steepening in a tight labor market． If the Phillips curve has steepened in this way， a small change in labor market tightness could result in a more substantial change in inflation． It is difficult to know with precision how steep that relationship is in real time or how it might evolve as labor market tightness changes．

　　這些或熟悉或陌生的不確定性，給我們在貨幣政策過度緊縮的風險與緊縮力度不足的風險之間找到平衡的工作提出了難題。緊縮力度不足會讓高于目標水平的通脹積重難返，最終貨幣政策為從經濟當中祓除更為頑固的通脹，要在就業方面付出更高昂的代價。過度緊縮會對經濟造成不必要的傷害。

　　These uncertainties， both old and new， complicate our task of balancing the risk of tightening monetary policy too much against the risk of tightening too little． Doing too little could allow above-target inflation to become entrenched and ultimately require monetary policy to wring more persistent inflation from the economy at a high cost to employment． Doing too much could also do unnecessary harm to the economy．

　　總結

　　就像大多數時候那樣，我們在烏云密布的天空下尋星導航。在這樣的情況下，風險管理方面的考量極為關鍵。在接下來的FOMC會議上，我們會基于所有數據和不斷演變的前景與風險，對我們的進展做出評估。基于這一評估，我們會在決定是進一步緊縮還是維持政策利率不變等待更多數據出爐上謹慎行事。恢復價格穩定對于不折不扣地實現我們的雙重使命而言至關重要。我們需要價格穩定，以實現持續一段時間的強勁勞動力市場狀況，從而造福所有人。

　　As is often the case， we are navigating by the stars under cloudy skies． In such circumstances， risk-management considerations are critical． At upcoming meetings， we will assess our progress based on the totality of the data and the evolving outlook and risks． Based on this assessment， we will proceed carefully as we decide whether to tighten further or， instead， to hold the policy rate constant and await further data． Restoring price stability is essential to achieving both sides of our dual mandate． We will need price stability to achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all．

　　不到大功告成之時，我們不會罷休。

　　We will keep at it until the job is done．

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責任編輯：王永生