意見領袖丨金融四十人論壇

　　“以美國為主導建立起來的戰(zhàn)后全球機制，無法持續(xù)地維持和管理超級大國之間的關系，尤其是在經(jīng)濟與貿易領域。”在第二屆外灘金融峰會上，英國《金融時報》副主編及首席經(jīng)濟評論員馬丁·沃爾夫（Martin WOLF）說道。

　　他表示，新冠疫情導致了20世紀30年代以來最嚴重的全球經(jīng)濟衰退，帶來了劇烈震蕩，但疫情本身并不會帶來新的變化，而只是此前既有趨勢的加速劑——疫情爆發(fā)之前的很長一段時間里，全球不平等現(xiàn)象不斷加劇，經(jīng)濟貿易自由化進程早已放緩。

　　他認為，各國“基本的共同利益”就是和平與繁榮，各國一要共同管理全球公域、應對氣候變化等全球挑戰(zhàn)，二要就如何應對全球挑戰(zhàn)達成最低限度的協(xié)議，開展有紀律的、基于規(guī)則的合作。

　　特別地，在貿易協(xié)商方面，超級大國需要就產(chǎn)業(yè)政策、知識產(chǎn)權、貿易開放、投資開放這四個主要領域重啟談判。“在理想情況下，談判是在國際多邊框架下進行，而不是像特朗普政府那樣，在純雙邊的框架下進行。”馬丁·沃爾夫表示。

　　談及美國大選及其影響，馬丁·沃爾夫稱“it will change everything and nothing”——

　　它會改變一切，因為拜登政府會重新參與多邊框架、重新加強與盟友的關系、重新參與應對氣候變化等全球挑戰(zhàn)、重新?lián)肀Э茖W。

　　它什么都無法改變，因為美國仍然是一個嚴重分裂的大國，比過去更具防御性、更崇尚保護主義。最重要的是，比起過去，美國會對中國的科技發(fā)展等保持更加警惕的態(tài)度。

　　“總之，我們面臨的主要挑戰(zhàn)是如何盡可能在多邊框架下、在不導致國際關系完全崩潰的前提下，盡可能有效地管理國際關系。解決中美沖突是不可能的，但管理是可能的，更是必要的。”他強調。

　　以下為馬丁·沃爾夫在第二屆外灘金融峰會上的演講全文。

　　中文實錄

　　我的基本觀點是，我們當前面對的國際局勢是前所未有的。

　　我接下來要談的幾個問題是：世界經(jīng)濟是如何走到今天這一步的？新冠疫情帶來了哪些影響？在當前大國競爭的時代，全球治理將會如何演變、應該如何演變？區(qū)域主義（regionalism）在當前國際環(huán)境中扮演著怎樣的角色？美國大選結果會產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響？

　　首先談談基本觀點——我們當前面對的國際局勢是前所未有的。

　　自二戰(zhàn)以來，世界上第一次出現(xiàn)了兩個相互對抗的超級大國——它們在所有領域都堪稱超級大國，且兩國經(jīng)濟與世界經(jīng)濟緊密結合、彼此之間也深度融合。

　　這種關系與冷戰(zhàn)有著根本不同。冷戰(zhàn)時期，美國乃至整個西方世界與蘇聯(lián)在經(jīng)濟上是完全割裂開來的。冷戰(zhàn)實質上是戰(zhàn)略和意識形態(tài)的競爭，這與現(xiàn)在的情況完全不同。現(xiàn)在的情況與后冷戰(zhàn)時代也有著本質區(qū)別，因為從所有重要的領域來看，當時美國是唯一的超級大國。

　　今天的國際形勢更像是一戰(zhàn)前。工業(yè)革命之前，不可能出現(xiàn)當下的格局，因為當時還沒有真正意義上的全球經(jīng)濟。但是，在一戰(zhàn)前，世界上至少有五六個強國，都在一定程度上融入了世界經(jīng)濟，而且那時候，沒有任何一個國家占絕對主導地位。當時的強國有英國、美國、德國、法國、俄羅斯和日本。20世紀初，中國還未能入列全球強國。

　　所以當前的國際局勢是前所未有的。在此背景下，我們可以看出，以美國為主導建立起來的戰(zhàn)后全球機制，對于調節(jié)超級大國之間的關系并不十分奏效。

　　這些全球機制無法持續(xù)地維持和管理超級大國之間的關系，尤其是在大國關系最發(fā)達的領域——經(jīng)濟與貿易。

　　這種機制失能有五個根本原因：

　　第一，國際規(guī)則與機制的結構不完整，在貿易、技術和投資領域有著重要缺陷。

　　第二，目前的國際規(guī)則對超級大國行為構成的約束力非常薄弱，這是一個內在的、不可避免的缺陷。

　　第三，目前的國際規(guī)則無法迅速適應全球競爭格局發(fā)生的深刻變化。今天的中國早已不是2001年的中國了，但我們卻未能及時應對這種變化、相應調整國際規(guī)則與大國關系。

　　第四，目前的國際規(guī)則從根本上深刻依賴于主權國家之間的信任，這是支撐其運作的根本。主權國家的合法權威與權力永遠是支撐國際秩序的根本。

　　第五，恰恰是在我們最需要大家都信任的全球規(guī)則體系時，這種信任不可避免地會崩潰。就是因為這種信任的瓦解，國際規(guī)則體系才無法繼續(xù)發(fā)揮作用。

　　第二個問題：長期來看，全球經(jīng)濟是如何演變的？新冠疫情在其中扮演什么角色？

　　毋庸置疑，新冠疫情產(chǎn)生了巨大的經(jīng)濟沖擊，導致了20世紀30年代以來最嚴重的全球經(jīng)濟衰退，帶來了劇烈震蕩。比起以前，此次經(jīng)濟衰退對更多國家產(chǎn)生了不利影響。與以往危機相比，今年預計會有更多的國家陷入衰退，經(jīng)濟大幅下滑。也就是說，沒有任何人能幸免。

　　預計中國將是今年唯一一個實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟正增長的主要經(jīng)濟體，但也不會增長太多。我此前也提到，疫情將對經(jīng)濟產(chǎn)生長期影響，因為其沖擊太強，會嚴重損害全球經(jīng)濟和各國經(jīng)濟。總體來看，目前的形勢正在印證這一判斷。

　　但我們需要更清楚地認識新冠疫情發(fā)生的背景——疫情來襲時，我們其實已經(jīng)面對著諸多挑戰(zhàn)。上一場金融危機僅僅過去了12年。因此，自20世紀30年代以來世界經(jīng)濟經(jīng)歷的最大兩次震蕩，都發(fā)生在這短短的12年間。

　　尤其是在西方世界，我們普遍未能恢復危機前的增長率，所以比起我們13、14年前設想的情況，我們目前實際上要窮得多。同時，疫情爆發(fā)之前的很長一段時間里，全球不平等現(xiàn)象不斷加劇，大多數(shù)人收入增長非常不理想，這種情況在很多國家——事實上在所有西方國家——都廣泛存在，在美國尤為突出。

　　金融危機加上長期的不平等加劇，導致了西方國家民粹主義抬頭，特朗普（的當選）集中體現(xiàn)了這一點。

　　事實證明，金融危機也成為了全球化進程包括貿易發(fā)展過程中的轉折點。危機后，全球貿易增長經(jīng)歷了大幅放緩，再也未能恢復到危機前的活躍程度。

　　此外，我們要清楚，最近一次真正意義上的全球貿易自由化的重要事件是中國入世，而那已經(jīng)是將近20年前的事了。因此，早在金融危機之前——更是早在新冠疫情之前——經(jīng)濟貿易自由化進程就已經(jīng)開始放緩了。新冠疫情是全球經(jīng)濟經(jīng)歷的又一負面沖擊。

　　第三個問題：新冠疫情產(chǎn)生了怎樣的影響？

　　我認為疫情是此前所有既有趨勢的加速劑。疫情本身并不會帶來新的變化，只是加速了之前的各種變化。

　　疫情凸顯了不平等現(xiàn)象，尤其是西方社會的不平等——疫情對欠缺專門技能的勞動力、年輕人、帶孩子的母親和少數(shù)族裔產(chǎn)生了更大的沖擊，加劇了社會的不平等。

　　疫情也凸顯了各國之間的深刻的不平等，特別是享有政策空間的國家和缺乏政策空間的國家之間的不平等；疫情極大地加速了科技的運用，讓國際經(jīng)濟更迅速地適應、轉向更加“虛擬”的當下與未來；疫情也加速了大國關系的破裂，其中最明顯的一點就是各國就疫情問題相互推諉責任。

　　以上這些是顯而易見的，但我還想強調，我們目前還是面臨著巨大的不確定性，不管是疫情的走向還是經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。這可能涉及到我們經(jīng)歷的這些震蕩所產(chǎn)生的長期影響。

　　第四個問題：在當前大國競爭的時代，全球治理會如何演變？

　　我們需要對“基本的共同利益”有一個清晰的定義。我認為，各國“基本的共同利益”就是和平與繁榮。

　　第一，為了捍衛(wèi)“繁榮”這一共同利益，我們需要共同管理全球公域（global commons）、應對全球挑戰(zhàn)，特別是氣候變化。

　　第二，各國需要就如何應對全球挑戰(zhàn)達成最低限度的協(xié)議，才能維護和平與繁榮。根據(jù)過去的經(jīng)驗，要做到這一點，我們要需要開展有紀律的、基于規(guī)則的合作。

　　在貿易領域，超級大國需要在兩個方面發(fā)力——

　　第一，它們需要在國內政策的自由度上達成更多的統(tǒng)一和一致，主要包括技術空間（technology space）、調整過程（adjustment process）、暫時性保護（temporary protection）措施以及產(chǎn)業(yè)政策（industrial policy）四個領域的國內政策。各國應享有怎樣的國內政策空間？應共同遵守怎樣的規(guī)則？

　　第二，為了更好地管理上述領域的關系，需要在哪些重要國際規(guī)則上重啟協(xié)商？這是超級大國需要考慮的問題。鑒于中國當前的經(jīng)濟規(guī)模與近年來的發(fā)展，相關協(xié)商必然涉及到中國應承擔怎樣的責任。

　　貿易協(xié)商涉及四個主要領域：產(chǎn)業(yè)政策、知識產(chǎn)權、貿易開放、投資開放。我認為這些領域的規(guī)則都需要重新談判。在理想情況下，談判是在國際多邊框架下進行的，而不是像特朗普政府那樣，在純雙邊的框架下進行。

　　我認為，關貿總協(xié)定、世貿組織的歷史表明，大國在多邊框架下達成協(xié)議要比在雙邊框架下容易得多，因為在雙邊框架下達成的協(xié)議中，總有一方會認為自己做出了“有失顏面的”（humiliating）妥協(xié)，沒有任何一個國家愿意做出這種讓步。

　　所以，我們該做什么、該怎么做其實已經(jīng)很清晰了。當然，我對于取得實質性的進展并不特別樂觀，但是我認為這是我們應該做的事。

　　第五個問題：區(qū)域主義（regionalism）在當前國際環(huán)境中扮演著怎樣的角色？

　　我認為區(qū)域主義必定會不斷增長，而且這會導致幾個大問題。

　　全球性的大國有著全球性的利益，而這些利益不可避免地存在重疊和沖突。全球性大國沒有純粹的區(qū)域性利益，所以區(qū)域主義對它們來說永遠不夠。

　　當然，我們需要建立一定的規(guī)則，來管理區(qū)域關系，這恰恰就是世貿組織成立的初衷。否則，區(qū)域主義就會演變成圍繞特定范圍利益的戰(zhàn)爭，而區(qū)域之間的界限不可避免地會出現(xiàn)界定不清的情況。這也是美國政治家Cordell Hull推崇非歧視原則（non-discrimination）的原因。

　　最后一個問題：美國大選及其影響。

　　我認為，美國大選的結果會改變一切，同時，什么都無法改變（it will change everything and nothing）。

　　它會改變一切，因為拜登政府會重新參與多邊框架、重新加強與盟友的關系、重新參與應對氣候變化等全球挑戰(zhàn)、重新?lián)肀Э茖W。

　　它什么都無法改變，因為美國仍然是一個嚴重分裂的大國，比過去更具防御性、更崇尚保護主義；最重要的是，比起過去，美國會對中國的科技發(fā)展等保持更加警惕的態(tài)度。

　　總之，我們面臨的主要挑戰(zhàn)是如何盡可能在多邊框架下、在不導致國際關系完全崩潰的的前提下，盡可能有效地管理國際關系。解決中美沖突是不可能的，但管理是可能的，更是必要的。

　　英文實錄

　　It’s a tremendous honor to participate in this high-level discussion． I’m going to address the questions that we were asked by the organizers of this session in the Bund Summit， which I thought were very relevant．

　　They are very broad． So， I’ll deal with this in a broader， more strategic way than quite a few of the comments so far have done． I’m assuming we’ve already had some wonderful， detailed discussion of trade relations in many different areas and the politics associated with that． I’m going to try and present my overview of where we are． I’m going to make one statement and then address five questions．

　　My opening statement is that the situation we are in globally is essentially unprecedented． That’s important to understand． The questions I’m going to address are： How has the world economy got to where it is now？ What is the legacy of COVID-19？ How will or should global governance evolve in a time of great power competition？ How does regionalism fit into this global context？ And finally， what might be the implications of the US election？

　　The opening statement is that this is an unprecedented situation．

　　For the first time since World War II， we have in the world two rival superpowers． They are superpowers on all domains． They are also deeply integrated with the world economy and with each other．

　　This is fundamentally different from the Cold War when the US and the West more broadly were completely economically separated from the Soviet Union． So that was essentially just a strategic and ideological competition． This is something very different． This is also fundamentally different from the post-Cold War era when the US was the dominant power essentially in all important respects．

　　Today looks a bit like the pre-World-War-I situation． Nothing before the industrial revolution could have been like this， because that wasn’t really a global economy． But in that pre-World War situation， there were at least five great powers all integrated to some degree in the world economy and at that stage no one power was dominant． They were the UK， the US， Germany， France， Russia and Japan． China was essentially out of the world power system in the early 20th century．

　　So， the world we are in now is really different． In this unprecedented situation， it has become apparent that the global institutions which were created in the post-second-world-war era， largely under the US aegis， do not work very well for relations between superpowers．

　　These institutions have been unable to contain and manage the relations between the superpowers and particularly in the economic sphere where those relations were most developed， namely， trade． This inability to manage the relationships among the superpowers is so for five fundamental reasons．

　　First， the international structure of rules and institutions is incomplete． It has very important lacunae in trade， technology and investment．

　　Second， the disciplines that the international rules give on the behavior of superpowers is inherently and inevitably very weak．

　　Third， the rules cannot adjust quickly enough to profound changes in global competitiveness． The China of today is simply not the China of 2001． But we can’t adjust the rules and relations quickly enough to cope with this change．

　　Fourth， they depend profoundly and fundamentally on trust among the sovereign states that ultimately underpin them． It is always the legal authority and the power of sovereign states that underpins the global order．

　　Fifth， such trust inevitably collapses exactly when one most needs a global system of rules that people believe in． It is the breakdown of trust that makes it impossible for this to work． So that’s the first issue I wanted to address – the unprecedented situation we are in and the implications it has．

　　The second question is： how has the world economy evolved in the longer term and where does COVID-19 fit in？

　　COVID-19 is obviously an enormous economic shock． It has created the biggest global recession since the 1930s， a very brutal， sharp shock， and that recession seems to have affected more countries than ever before． This year more countries will be in recession or have big economic declines than probably ever before． That is to say everybody has been affected．

　　China looks like being the only large economy to grow this year， and it won’t be by very much． We risk suffering， as I argued in my column this week， from what I call a long economic COVID， that is a long economic legacy of the disease， because the shock is so big that it is doing an enormous amount of damage globally and domestically． This looks increasingly plausible．

　　But it is also vital to remember the background． COVID-19 came at us in a rather unfortunate context． We had a huge financial crisis only 12 years ago， so we’ve had the two biggest shocks to the world economy since the 1930s within just 12 years．

　　In the western world particularly， we have failed to recover pre-financial-crisis growth rates， and that’s pretty well universal， so we are much poorer than we thought we would be 13 or 14 years ago． That shock also followed a long period of rising inequality and weak income growth for most people in many of our economies - in fact， in all the western economies， in particular the US.The crisis then combined with that long period of rising inequality has had a marked populist legacy across the western world， of which Donald Trump is one key symptom．

　　The crisis also proved to be a turning point for globalization， including trade， with a marked slowdown in the growth of world trade since the financial crisis occurred． Again， it has never been as buoyant as it was before that crisis．

　　Finally， it is worth remembering that the last really big significant liberalization of trade was China’s WTO accession， which is now nearly 20 years ago． So， the liberalization thrust died long before the financial crisis， and long， long before COVID-19． This is another shock on top of many previous shocks．

　　The third question is： what is the legacy of COVID-19？

　　The way I think of it is that it is an accelerator of these prior trends． It is not so much something new． It’s mainly accelerating various prior changes． It has underlined deep inequalities particularly within western societies with a very unequal impact on the unskilled， the young， mothers with children， and minorities．

　　It has underlined global inequalities between countries， particularly those with policy space and those without． It has dramatically accelerated technological adoption， shifting the world economy more rapidly into our more “virtual” present and future． It has accelerated the breakdown in relations among the great powers， a post-pandemic “blame game” being the most obvious symptom of this breakdown．

　　While these things are reasonably clear it has to be stressed that there is a huge amount that remains uncertain about the future course of the disease and the economy． I’m guessing these are the longer-term implications of some of the shocks that we have experienced．

　　The fourth question is： how might global governance evolve in a time of great power competition？

　　It is necessary to define essential common interests． I define essential common interest as peace and prosperity． Prosperity includes successful sharing in the management of the global commons， notably the climate challenge．

　　My second key point is that it is essential to reach minimum agreements on how to manage those challenges， to preserve peace and to preserve prosperity． To do that， it would certainly， we know that from past experience， take disciplined and rules-governed cooperation．

　　In trade， the superpowers have to move on two fronts．

　　First， greater convergence and agreement on what freedom they need to have on domestic policy - the technology space， the adjustment process， the temporary protection issues， and the industrial policy issues． What freedoms do they need to have and what rules must they share？

　　Second， they need to consider re-negotiating crucial global rules governing these relations， which all have to include the question of what obligations China now has given its enormous scale and development．

　　There are four main areas for negotiation in the trade agenda area： industrial policy， intellectual property， openness to trade， and openness to investment． My view is these are all going to need to be renegotiated， but ideally in a global setting， not in a purely bilateral context as has happened under the Trump administration．

　　I believe that the history of the GATT/WTO shows that it is far easier for great powers to reach agreements in that multilateral setting than it is in a purely bilateral setting． Because concessions made in a bilateral setting are always seen as humiliating， and countries won’t make concessions that they see as humiliating．

　　So， the agenda is pretty clear and the way to do it is pretty clear． Obviously， I’m not terribly optimistic that it can be achieved， but I think it’s what we have to do．

　　The fifth question is： how does regionalism fit into this global context？

　　Regionalism is bound to increase， but it creates several huge problems． Global powers have global interests which unavoidably overlap and often conflict． There are no purely regional interests for global powers． So， regionalism is never enough for them． And there have to be rules governing the interaction of regional relationships． That’s what the WTO is for． Otherwise， regionalism turns into a war over spheres of interest， with inevitably unclear boundaries． This is why Cordell Hull promoted non-discrimination．

　　The last question is： what might be the implications of the US election？

　　My view is the outcome of the US election will change everything and nothing． It will change everything， because a Biden administration will re-engage multilaterally， seek to revitalize alliances， re-engage on core global challenges such as climate， and embrace science． It will change nothing because the US remains a deeply divided country and power， one that is far more defensive and protectionist than in the past． Above all， it will remain far more suspicious of China’s rising power， technological ambitions， political system and ideology．

　　To conclude， the challenge ahead of us is to achieve the best possible management of global relations within， if at all possible， a multilateral context， and without a total breakdown． Resolution of the tensions between the US and China is impossible， but management is possible and essential．

　　(本文作者介紹：中國金融四十人論壇(CF40)是一家非官方、非營利性的專業(yè)智庫，定位為“平臺+實體”新型智庫，專注于經(jīng)濟金融領域的政策研究。)