新浪財經(jīng)訊 北京時間10月13日晚間消息，法國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家梯若爾因?qū)κ袌隽α亢捅O(jiān)管的研究，獲得2014年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎，以下為諾獎委員會給出的獲獎理由。
梯若爾躋身當(dāng)今最具影響力的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家之列，他在眾多領(lǐng)域做出了重要的理論研究貢獻(xiàn)，他最杰出的成就是闡明了如何理解和監(jiān)管由數(shù)家公司巨頭主導(dǎo)的行業(yè)。
很多行業(yè)為數(shù)家大型公司或單個寡頭控制。監(jiān)管缺失，類似市場的產(chǎn)物都不受社會歡迎：非成本因素造成的價格高企，或是效率低下的公司通過阻礙新的、更高效的公司進(jìn)入市場而存活。
1980年代中期以來，梯若爾向該類市場失敗的學(xué)術(shù)研究中注入了新生命。他對市場強(qiáng)權(quán)公司的分析提供了一個統(tǒng)一的理論，提出了一個強(qiáng)有力的中央政策問題：政府如何應(yīng)對公司合并或卡特爾，以及應(yīng)該如何監(jiān)管壟斷性公司？
在梯若爾之前，研究人員和政策制定者尋求適合所有行業(yè)的總體規(guī)則。他們倡導(dǎo)簡單的政策規(guī)則，如為寡頭設(shè)定價格上限、禁止競爭者之間串通，但允許價值鏈上位置不同的公司進(jìn)行合作。梯若爾的理論顯示，這些監(jiān)管規(guī)則或在特定狀況下有效果，但在其他情況下則弊大于利。
價格上限能為統(tǒng)治性公司提供削減成本的有力動機(jī)，這有利于社會利益，但價格上限也可能會允許過度利潤存在，這又不利于社會。市場中在定價上進(jìn)行合作通常有害，但專利上的合作能夠造福社會。一家公司和其供應(yīng)商合并可以鼓勵創(chuàng)新，但也會扭曲競爭。
因此，最佳的監(jiān)管或競爭政策應(yīng)該審慎地適應(yīng)各個行業(yè)特定的狀況。在一系列的文章和著述中，梯若爾闡述了設(shè)計這類政策的基本框架，以及如何讓其適應(yīng)于一 系列的行業(yè)，其范圍從電信業(yè)直至銀行業(yè)等。借助這些新的理念，政府可以更好地鼓勵強(qiáng)大的公司變得更具創(chuàng)造力，同時又防范它們傷害競爭和客戶。(谷云)
英文頒獎詞如下：
The science of taming powerful firms
Jean Tirole is one of the most influential economists of our time. He has made important theoretical research contributions in a number of areas, but most of all he has clarified how to understand and regulate industries with a few powerful firms。
Many industries are dominated by a small number of large firms or a single monopoly. Left unregulated, such markets often produce socially undesirable results – prices higher than those motivated by costs, or unproductive firms that survive by blocking the entry of new and more productive ones。
From the mid-1980s and onwards, Jean Tirole has breathed new life into research on such market failures. His analysis of firms with market power provides a unified theory with a strong bearing on central policy questions: how should the government deal with mergers or cartels, and how should it regulate monopolies?
Before Tirole, researchers and policymakers sought general principles for all industries. They advocated simple policy rules, such as capping prices for monopolists and prohibiting cooperation between competitors, while permitting cooperation between firms with different positions in the value chain. Tirole showed theoretically that such rules may work well in certain conditions, but do more harm than good in others. Price caps can provide dominant firms with strong motives to reduce costs – a good thing for society – but may also permit excessive profits – a bad thing for society. Cooperation on price setting within a market is usually harmful, but cooperation regarding patent pools can benefit everyone. The merger of a firm and its supplier may encourage innovation, but may also distort competition。
The best regulation or competition policy should therefore be carefully adapted to every industry’s specific conditions. In a series of articles and books, Jean Tirole has presented a general framework for designing such policies and applied it to a number of industries, ranging from telecommunications to banking. Drawing on these new insights, governments can better encourage powerful firms to become more productive and, at the same time, prevent them from harming competitors and customers。
