俄羅斯的商界巨頭先是專心斂聚大筆財(cái)富，然后自吹自擂，但后來(lái)?yè)?dān)心在弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)總統(tǒng)對(duì)他們政治上打壓，所以又試圖淡化自己的財(cái)富。現(xiàn)在世界銀行(World Bank)對(duì)此作了一次重要嘗試，算一算俄國(guó)商界巨頭對(duì)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)的控制究竟有多大。

Russia's business tycoons first concentrated on accumulating their vast wealth, then boasted about it, and have since tried to downplay it as they fear a political clampdown against them under President Vladimir Putin. Now the World Bank has made an important stab at calculating just how significant their grip on the national economy really is.

在本周發(fā)表的一份史無(wú)前例的報(bào)告中，世界銀行駐莫斯科代表處協(xié)同一個(gè)俄羅斯及國(guó)外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家小組，對(duì)此作了估算。結(jié)果顯示，以銷售額衡量，僅23名個(gè)人或集團(tuán)就控制了俄羅斯三分之一以上的工業(yè)，他們還控制著16%的就業(yè)，并掌握所有銀行業(yè)資產(chǎn)的17%。

In a ground-breaking report published this week, the Bank's Moscow office, in association with a team of Russian and foreign economists, estimates that just 23 individuals or groups control more than a third of the country's industry as measured by sales, and 16 per cent of employment. They also hold 17 per cent of all banking assets.

排名表上的名字并不令人十分吃驚。他們大多是有政治影響力的寡頭及他們的商界伙伴，過(guò)去幾年中，他們已經(jīng)聲名顯赫。其中多數(shù)人在以前的評(píng)估中已得到確認(rèn)，如《福布斯》(Forbes)雜志的全球富人榜。

There are no big surprises in the names that dominate the list [see table 1]. They mostly correspond to those politically influential oligarchs and their business partners whose identities have become well known over the past few years. Most of the individuals have been identified by previous estimates, such as Forbes magazine's list of the world's richest.

但引人注目的是，該報(bào)告證實(shí)，幾大公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者的重要性， 與其說(shuō)是體現(xiàn)在不多的幾個(gè)上市集團(tuán)內(nèi)，倒不如說(shuō)是體現(xiàn)在在更廣泛的俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)背景中。世界銀行研究人員首次嘗試在公開(kāi)信息以外深入挖掘，對(duì)全俄42個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)部門的1300多家公司的樣本進(jìn)行研究。

But what is striking is that it confirms the weight of a few corporate operators when seen in the context of the broader Russian economy, rather than simply in a handful of quoted groups. For the first time, the World Bank's researchers attempted to dig well beyond public information, studying a sample of more than 1,300 companies in 42 sectors across the country.

上世紀(jì)90年代中期， 俄國(guó)出現(xiàn)了一場(chǎng)頗有爭(zhēng)議的銷價(jià)內(nèi)部“債轉(zhuǎn)股”私有化運(yùn)動(dòng)，而該私有化運(yùn)動(dòng)的受益者在排名中明顯靠前。但也有些出人意料的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者名列前茅，對(duì)了解十幾名之后的那些入選人士，該報(bào)告也有可圈可點(diǎn)的洞見(jiàn)。

Those who benefited from the controversial cut-price, insider "loans for shares" privatisations of the mid-1990s are all well represented. But there are also some unexpected contenders high in the rankings, and intriguing insights into the next group of people below the first dozen.

例如，伊力姆漿紙(Ilim Pulp)的控制者排名居前，表明俄羅斯巨大的原材料財(cái)富的重要地位，甚至超過(guò)了更出名的石油和天然氣行業(yè)。這有助于解釋，為什么該公司已成為奧列格•德里帕斯卡(Oleg Deripaska)來(lái)勢(shì)洶洶的惡意收購(gòu)對(duì)象。這位寡頭最初是在鋁業(yè)成名的。

Those controlling Ilim Pulp, for example, come high on the list, illustrating the significance of Russia's vast raw materials wealth even beyond the better known oil and gas sectors. That helps explain why it has been the subject of such heated hostile takeover attention by Oleg Deripaska, the oligarch who first made his name in aluminium.

不同行業(yè)所有權(quán)的集中程度相差甚遠(yuǎn)。若說(shuō)黑色和有色金屬、礦砂、鋁、石油和交通行業(yè)均由寡頭集團(tuán)高度支配，那么其他行業(yè)則掌握在不同人的手中：例如建筑、木材、谷類加工、家具和烘焙行業(yè)。

Concentration of ownership varies widely between sectors. If ferrous and non-ferrous metals, ore, aluminium, oil and vehicle sectors are all heavily dominated by the oligarchic groups, others remain in different hands: in construction, timber, milling, furniture and baking, for example.

但數(shù)據(jù)也顯示，即使在寡頭控制的公司里也的確有少數(shù)股股東，但他們始終只是少數(shù)股股東。高度集中的控制權(quán)依然是主導(dǎo)模式，在俄羅斯，分散所有權(quán)的文化看來(lái)還很遙遠(yuǎn)。

But the data also show that while minority shareholders do exist even in oligarch-controlled companies, they remain precisely that. Firmly concentrated control remains the dominant model, and a culture of dispersed ownership still seems a long way off in Russia.

寡頭平均持有各自公司近80%的股份，這種支配程度比其他類型公司的所有者都高。但在公共部門、外商和其他私人所有者控制的企業(yè)中，主導(dǎo)股東的持股比例也還在70%以上。

Oligarchs on average hold nearly 80 per cent of the shares in their companies, a greater degree of dominance than for companies controlled by other types of owner. But the proportion in the dominant shareholder's hands remains above 70 per cent for businesses controlled by the public sector, by foreigners and by other private owners alike.

很難把這些數(shù)據(jù)放到國(guó)際環(huán)境中去衡量，因?yàn)樵谄渌�地方幾乎沒(méi)有做過(guò)如此規(guī)模的比較研究。但在俄羅斯這個(gè)15年前拋棄了國(guó)有計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)的國(guó)家，已出現(xiàn)一個(gè)重要的準(zhǔn)繩：除了一些私有業(yè)主外，國(guó)家仍是商業(yè)領(lǐng)域極重要的控制者。

It is difficult to put these figures into international context, since few comparative studies on such a scale have taken place elsewhere. But one important yardstick that emerges from a country that turned its back on state planning 15 years ago is that alongside a few private owners, the Russian state remains a highly significant controller of business.

該準(zhǔn)繩適用于聯(lián)邦政府，它控制著另外20%的工業(yè)銷售額，以及8%的就業(yè)。該準(zhǔn)繩也適用于一些地區(qū)，特別是韃靼斯坦和巴什闊爾托斯坦，這兩個(gè)少數(shù)民族共和國(guó)拒絕上世紀(jì)90年代發(fā)起的全國(guó)規(guī)模的私有化運(yùn)動(dòng)。這兩個(gè)地區(qū)政府各自占有另外5%的銷售和3%的就業(yè)。

That applies to the federal government, which accounts for a further 20 per cent of total industrial sales and 8 per cent of employment. It also applies to some regions, notably Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, ethnic republics that refused the privatisations launched nationally during the 1990s. Regional governments collectively account for a further 5 and 3 per cent of sales and jobs respectively.

最有爭(zhēng)議的是，該研究試圖估算集中所有權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。公眾對(duì)寡頭的理解是，他們以太低的價(jià)格不公平地攫取了資產(chǎn)控制權(quán)，但許多分析師聲稱，他們至少是抵制政府、推行重組的必要力量，結(jié)果創(chuàng)造出一個(gè)更有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的私人部門。

Most controversially, the study attempts to assess the economic value of concentrated ownership. While the public perception of oligarchs is that they unfairly seized control of assets too cheaply, many analysts have argued that they at least provided a necessary force to resist the state and to push through restructuring, creating a more competitive private sector as a result.

世界銀行的研究結(jié)論稱，根據(jù)銷售額、利潤(rùn)和生產(chǎn)率計(jì)算，寡頭控制的公司比那些聯(lián)邦或地區(qū)政府控制的公司管理得更好。

The World Bank study concludes that companies controlled by oligarchs are better managed than those held by federal and regional governments, as measured by sales, profits and productivity.

但沒(méi)有證據(jù)表明，寡頭的表現(xiàn)明顯優(yōu)于其他經(jīng)濟(jì)部門，而且該研究歸結(jié)說(shuō)，與規(guī)模更小且更有活力的私人所有者相比，寡頭管理者實(shí)際上效率更低。

But there is no evidence that oligarchs significantly outperform the rest of the economy, and the study concludes that they are in fact less efficient managers of assets than smaller, more dynamic private owners.

寡頭集團(tuán)主導(dǎo)了投資流動(dòng)，它們的投資比私人所有者的投資高出30%。但主要原因，它們恰恰控制了產(chǎn)生大量現(xiàn)金的高利潤(rùn)率出口銷售業(yè)，而較少投資于他們進(jìn)行多元化投資的其他行業(yè)。寡頭并不總像人們認(rèn)為的那樣有影響力。在分析本地權(quán)勢(shì)企業(yè)（那些獲得過(guò)多特殊稅收優(yōu)惠、市場(chǎng)特權(quán)和財(cái)政援助計(jì)劃的公司）的“地區(qū)掌控”程度時(shí)，寡頭的排名整體上落后于地區(qū)和聯(lián)邦政府擁有的企業(yè)。而參與“債轉(zhuǎn)股”私有化的少數(shù)寡頭被證明是所有人中最有效率的政治說(shuō)客。

Oligarchic groups dominate investment flows, investing 30 per cent more than other private owners. But that is largely because they control precisely those sectors that provide large quantities of cash from high-margin export sales, while investing less in the other sectors into which they have diversified. d4 The oligarchs are not always as influential as they are made out to be. In analysing the extent of "regional capture" of local authorities - those companies that have secured disproportionate special tax concessions, market privileges and financial aid packages - they rank collectively behind businesses owned by regional and federal authorities and foreign investors. However, the smaller number of oligarchs involved in "loans for shares" privatisations prove the most effective lobbyists of all.

這些數(shù)據(jù)仍有不完善之處。要收集到具體的所有權(quán)信息是不可能的，因?yàn)槎鄶?shù)俄羅斯公司的控制權(quán)都掩藏在模糊的公司架構(gòu)之下，而且通常由海外信托機(jī)構(gòu)控制。這些數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)自金融分析師、記者和銀行業(yè)人士所作的評(píng)估，依據(jù)的是他們對(duì)俄羅斯公司控制狀況的了解。

There are still imperfections in the data. It is impossible to gather detailed ownership information, since control of most Russian companies is hidden behind obscure corporate structures, often through offshore trusts. The figures derive from assessments made by financial analysts, journalists and bankers, based on their perceptions of control.

要準(zhǔn)確估算寡頭的真實(shí)財(cái)富也是不可能的。有關(guān)寡頭所控公司的利潤(rùn)數(shù)據(jù)也很難獲得，更別說(shuō)公司估價(jià)了。哪怕是上市公司和經(jīng)審計(jì)的公司，分析師也常對(duì)它們的全面財(cái)務(wù)信息的披露狀況提出疑問(wèn)。許多寡頭的權(quán)益都在私有企業(yè)，而這些企業(yè)不受外部審查的約束。

Nor is it possible to estimate accurately the oligarchs' true wealth. Information on the profits, let alone valuations, of the companies they hold is difficult to obtain. Analysts often raise questions about the full financial disclosure even of those businesses that are quoted and audited. Many of the oligarchs' interests are in private companies subject to no external scrutiny.

最后，在這樣一個(gè)收購(gòu)及出售企業(yè)盛行的時(shí)期，很難評(píng)估寡頭所有權(quán)真正的長(zhǎng)期影響，也很難評(píng)估他們收購(gòu)業(yè)績(jī)最差企業(yè)的程度、以及是否仍在設(shè)法扭轉(zhuǎn)它們的局面。要想對(duì)此評(píng)估，則需要后續(xù)調(diào)查。

Finally, at a time of significant acquisition and sales of businesses, it is difficult to assess the true long-term impact of oligarch ownership, and how far they may have acquired the worst-performing companies, and still be working on turning them round. That will require follow-up surveys.

然而，總體而言，該研究清晰表明了一個(gè)重要的政策結(jié)論。那就是，如果說(shuō)，過(guò)去數(shù)年中，所有權(quán)集中可能已幫助推行了一些必要的重組，或者因當(dāng)時(shí)其他經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題需要優(yōu)先解決，所有權(quán)集中至少是個(gè)值得政府寬忍的障礙的話，那么現(xiàn)在對(duì)約束寡頭作用的時(shí)候了。

Overall, however, the study points clearly to an important policy conclusion. If ownership concentration may have helped push through some necessary restructuring over the past few years, or was at least a hindrance worth tolerating by the state at a time when other economic priorities dominated, it is now time to rein in the role of the oligarchs.

這份研究報(bào)告的作者表示，為了推動(dòng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，鼓勵(lì)小企業(yè)發(fā)展，有必要實(shí)施反壟斷政策以分拆大型集團(tuán)企業(yè)，并采取其他措施。這類舉措與美國(guó)在19世紀(jì)末為遏制所謂“強(qiáng)盜大亨”影響力采用的方式是相似的。

Antitrust policy to break up conglomerates and other measures to enhance competition and encourage the development of small businesses is essential, the authors argue. Such a move would mirror the way that the US curbed the influence of the so-called "robber barons" at the end of the 19th century.

要做到這一點(diǎn)，普京先生的新政府必須有能力建立一個(gè)更公正、更嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管體系，和一個(gè)完全獨(dú)立的司法體系，而不是發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)帶有政治動(dòng)機(jī)的捕風(fēng)捉影運(yùn)動(dòng)，來(lái)對(duì)付其選擇的目標(biāo)。

That requires an ability by Mr Putin's new administration to build a fairer, tougher regulatory system and a genuinely independent judiciary, rather to launch politically motivated witch-hunts against selected targets.

但是，如果今日的寡頭想在俄羅斯社會(huì)中展開(kāi)越來(lái)越多的慈善活動(dòng)，以此與當(dāng)年的卡內(nèi)基和洛克菲勒財(cái)團(tuán)相媲美，那他們也必須為了整個(gè)國(guó)家商業(yè)領(lǐng)域更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益著想，而接受對(duì)自身活動(dòng)產(chǎn)生的負(fù)面影響。

But if today's oligarchs want to compare themselves to the latter-day Carnegies and Rockefellers through their growing philanthropic activity in Russian society, they will also need to accept negative consequences on their own activities for the broader economic benefit of the country's business sector as a whole.

譯者/李裕