七個“重要工業(yè)國”中的歐洲國家周末在伯卡萊頓(Boca Raton)的會議上取得了勝利。但是只是紙上的勝利。一方面是因為G7的重要性正在下降，另一方面是G7成員國不愿意，或者說不能夠采取必要的措施有所作為。會后發(fā)表的聯(lián)合聲明雖然聲音洪亮，氣勢逼人，但作用甚微。

The European members of thesgroupsof seven "leading industrial countries" achieved a victory at the meeting in Boca Raton over the weekend. But it was a victory on paper. This is partly because the G7 is of declining significance and partly because its members are unwilling, or unable, to take the steps needed to make a difference. The communique is full of sound and fury, but signifies little.

聯(lián)合聲明似乎是有針對性的。聲明宣稱：“我們重申，匯率應當反應經(jīng)濟基本層面。匯率過于波動和無序變化對經(jīng)濟增長不利，……。在這種情況下，我們呼吁，本國貨幣匯率不具彈性的主要國家或經(jīng)濟體，應當按照市場機制，促進國際金融體系進行順利深入的調(diào)整”。

The document does appear to be purposive: "We reaffirm," it declares, "that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals. Excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates are undesirable for economic growth. . . In this context, we emphasise that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major countries or economic areas that lack such flexibility to promote smooth and widespread adjustments in the international financial system based on market mechanisms (my emphasis)."

對于G7中來自歐元區(qū)的3個國家來說，這次聲明的措辭糾正了去年十月迪拜會議后聯(lián)合聲明的錯誤。現(xiàn)在很清楚，這并不是針對歐元，而是針對缺乏“彈性”的貨幣，顯然是指亞洲國家的貨幣(見圖表)。G7一直在呼吁靈活匯率。但有哪個重要的國家予以理睬呢？回答幾乎可以肯定是：沒有。

For the three members of the G7 from the eurozone, this language rectifies the mistake made in the communique issued after the meeting in Dubai last October. Now it is far clearer that the finger points not at the euro, but at the currencies that lack "flexibility", notably the Asian ones (see chart). The G7 has spoken up for flexible exchange rates all round. But is anybody important listening? The answer, almost certainly, is: no.

不難理解為什么歐洲人表現(xiàn)得如此不安。按照經(jīng)合組織預測，雖然去年歐元區(qū)國內(nèi)需求本身應當使GDP增長1.2％，但是由于歐元飚升，凈貿(mào)易條件惡化，實現(xiàn)的經(jīng)濟增長只有0.5％。

It is not hard to understand why the Europeans should be so agitated. Last year, according to forecasts from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, eurozone domestic demand would have expanded GDP by 1.2 per cent, on its own. But the deterioration in net trade, as the euro soared, delivered economic growth of just 0.5 per cent.

同樣，歐洲國家也不難找到問題的根源。從2002年1月底美元開始迅速下跌，到去年10月為止，全球外匯儲備增長8310億美元。其中6110億美元是由亞洲各經(jīng)濟體累積的，最多的是日本，為2190億美元，然后是中國1840億美元，臺灣730億美元(見圖表)。在這21個月中，累積的全球外匯儲備主要投資于美國政府債券，相當于美國以外國家GDP總額的2.25％，美國GDP的4.5％。相對于全世界的GDP來說，這肯定是有史以來最大的“援助”項目。這使美國同時擁有大炮和黃油，而無需在兩者間進行選擇。

Nor is it hard for Europeans to identify the culprits. Between the end of January 2002, when the dollar started to fall briskly, and last October, global foreign currency reserves rose by bn. Of this, bn was accumulated by Asian countries, with Japan's bn, China's bn and Taiwan's bn in the lead (see chart). The global accumulation of foreign currency reserves, predominantly invested in US official obligations, was some 2?per cent of the rest of the world's GDP and 4?per cent of US GDP over the 21 months in question. This must be the biggest "aid" programme of all time, relative to global GDP. It has allowed the US to enjoy both guns and butter, without needing to choose between the two.

由于全球匯率調(diào)整在亞洲受阻，全部壓力落在了允許匯率自由浮動的貨幣肩上，包括歐元在內(nèi)(見圖表)。結果是，歐元區(qū)成員國受到疲軟的國內(nèi)需求和全球競爭力下降的“雙重打擊”。

With the global currency adjustment thwarted in Asia, it has fallen with full force on those currencies that are allowed to float freely, including the euro (see chart). The eurozone member countries have, as a result, been suffering from the "double whammy" of weak domestic demand and falling global competitiveness.

為什么亞洲國家如此行事呢？去年9月份發(fā)表的一篇文章對此作出了最有啟發(fā)性的詮釋*。舊有的布雷頓森林固定匯率體系于1970年代初瓦解。可是，由于亞洲新興市場經(jīng)濟體以及出于不同原因參與競爭的日本，試圖保持具有競爭力的匯率，導致現(xiàn)在又出現(xiàn)了一個修訂版的新制度，這便是澳大利亞經(jīng)濟學家馬克斯•考登(Max Corden)稱為的“匯率保護主義”。正如國家經(jīng)濟研究局(NBER)論文所述的那樣，亞洲國家選擇了“與戰(zhàn)后初期歐洲和日本同樣的對外經(jīng)濟戰(zhàn)略，低估本幣，實行較大程度的外匯干預，對(資本帳戶)進行控制，累積外匯儲備，鼓勵出口導向增長，將商品出口到有強大競爭力的發(fā)達國家。”

Why are the Asians behaving in this way? The most illuminating account was put forward in a paper published last September.* The old Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system broke down in the early 1970s. Today, however, a partial new system has emerged as Asian emerging market economies and, for somewhat different reasons, Japan, attempt to preserve competitive exchange rates. This is what the Australian economist Max Corden has called "exchange rate protectionism". As the NBER paper puts it, Asian countries have chosen "the same periphery strategy as immediate post-war Europe and Japan, undervaluing the exchange rate, managing sizeable foreign exchange interventions, imposing controls [on capital], accumulating reserves, and encouraging export-led growth by sending goods to the competitive centre countries."

我們暫且不論這是不是一種明智的策略。更為緊要的問題是，這種策略是否會并且什么時候會終止。部分的答案是，如果僅僅為了方便歐洲國家的話，沒有理由期望這些國家中的任何一個改變它們的外匯政策。如果亞洲人(日本除外)和美國人就某些問題達成共識的話，那就是經(jīng)濟陳舊政策僵化的歐洲國家自作自收。他們覺得沒有必要幫助那些自己不幫自己的人。

Let us put to one side the question of whether this is a sensible strategy. The more immediate one is whether and when it might end. Part of the answer is that there can be no reason to expect any of these countries to change their foreign exchange policies merely because they inconvenience Europeans. If non-Japanese Asians and Americans agree on anything it is that moaning Europeans are receiving precisely what their decrepit economies and policy sclerosis deserve. They feel little need to help those who do so little to help themselves.

亞洲國家只有在外匯儲備累積對貨幣及信用增加、通貨膨脹提高，以及壞帳風險加大產(chǎn)生不利影響時，才會改變政策。對日本來說，干預有利于幫助擺脫通貨緊縮根源。在中國，去年12月時的年度消費物價僅上升3.2％。總體而言，中國壓倒一切的目標仍然是經(jīng)濟增長，中國將拒絕任何威脅經(jīng)濟增長的政策改變。

Asians will change their policies only when the impact of reserve accumulation on the growth of money, credit, inflation and the accumulation of bad debts risks becoming highly adverse. For the Japanese, intervention helps lift the curse of deflation. For the Chinese, consumer prices only rose by 3.2 per cent in the year to last December. Above all, the overriding Chinese objective remains economic growth. Any policy change likely to threaten that will be rejected.

如果美國愿意的話，將肯定有能力摧毀亞洲的盯住匯率制度，就像1971年保護主義的“尼克松沖擊”一樣。美國可以對亞洲向美國的出口實施貿(mào)易壁壘，或者干脆多印美元，用于購買亞洲貨幣。但是美國不大可能采取其中的任何做法。與中國保持良好的關系，現(xiàn)在對美國來說具有全球地緣政治的意義。而且，亞洲國家情愿抬高美元債券和美元本身的價格，滿足了美國籌集龐大的政府和居民債務的需要。除非國內(nèi)保護主義思潮變得十分強大，美國沒有理由破壞亞洲重商主義者的匯率政策。

The US could certainly destroy the Asian exchange rate pegs if it wished to do so, as it did with the protectionist "Nixon shock" in 1971. It could do so by imposing trade barriers against Asian exports or by printing dollars, to purchase Asian currencies. But it is most unlikely to do either of these things. Good relations with China are now of geopolitical significance to the US. Moreover, the willingness of Asian countries to keep both US bond prices and the dollar up helps finance the huge borrowing of the US government and households. Unless domestic protectionist sentiment becomes overwhelming, there is no reason for the Americans to attack Asia's mercantilist foreign exchange policies.

最后，歐洲人可以通過參加干預主義者俱樂部實施自救。面臨升值壓力的貨幣當局總是可以通過開動印鈔機來減壓，但它們必須對失去對國內(nèi)貨幣的控制做好準備。這不大可能是歐洲央行將會做的事情。歐洲央行能夠(也應該)在這方面采取溫和的舉措，即降低利率。但是，因為對通貨膨脹有不必要的擔憂，歐洲央行甚至連這一步也不愿意走。

Finally, the Europeans could help themselves by joining the intervention club. The managers of a currency under upward pressure can always drive it down, by printing money, but only if they are also prepared to lose domestic monetary control in the process. That is hardly what the European Central Bank is about to do. It could (and should) take a modest step in this direction, by lowering its own interest rates. But, unduly worried by inflation, it seems unwilling to do even that.

底線是簡單明了的。歐洲國家可能既希望匯率更穩(wěn)定，也希望其更有競爭力。但是在當今世界經(jīng)濟中起作用的是美國的雙重赤字和亞洲的重商主義，這使歐洲人的愿望無法實現(xiàn)。除非采取目標明確的行動，否則聯(lián)合公報的價值只有寫在上邊的那張紙那么高。

The bottom line then is simple. The Europeans may want both a more stable and more competitive exchange rate. But the forces now at work in the world economy - the huge US twin deficits and Asian mercantilism - make their wishes irrelevant. Unless backed by purposeful action, communiques are barely worth the paper they are written on.

*邁克爾•P.多利(Michael P. Dooley)、大衛(wèi)•富科茨-蘭道(David Folkerts-Landau)和彼得•佳寶(Peter Garber)：“論修改版的布雷頓森林體系”，國家經(jīng)濟研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research)工作論文9971號，見www.nber.org

* Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, "An Essay on the Revised Bretton Woods System", Working Paper 9971, National Bureau of Economic Research, www.nber.org

譯者/秋實