安然、世通、泰科以及現今的帕瑪拉特丑聞震驚了工商界，并推動了新法規條例的出臺。不幸的是，這些法律干涉了合約的自由，而且有充分的理由相信，它們只會雪上加霜，而不會使形勢好轉。

Scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and now Parmalat have shaken the business world and prompted new laws and regulations. Unfortunately, these laws interfere with freedom of contract and there are strong reasons for thinking they will make things worse, not better.

設想一下，你創辦了一家公司，并希望公開上市。你必須既讓投資者相信這家公司會成功，又要讓他們相信內部人員不會竊取利潤。因此，你起草了一份公司章程，規定了各種各樣的保障條款。這就是你同股東間的合約。例如，該章程也許會明確說明一股一票，并禁止管理層對惡意收購采取防御性措施。或者，該章程也可能允許雙層股票(dual-class shares)，以及防止并購的措施。

Imagine that you have founded a company and want to take it public. You have to convince investors not only that the company will be successful but also that insiders will not steal the profits. So you write a corporate charter that puts in place various safeguards: this is your contract with the shareholders. For example, the charter may specify one share one vote and prohibit defensive measures by management against hostile bids. Or the charter may permit dual-class shares and takeover defences.

哪一個更好些呢？假設創始人想退休，到里維埃拉頤養天年。那么，第一種“親股東的”章程可能更好，因為它能使股價上漲、創始人發財致富。但是如果創始人非常關心公司的運營，第二種“親管理層的”章程也許不錯，因為股東投資無需太高，但創始人將控制公司的未來。

Which is better? Suppose the founder wants to retire to the Riviera. Then the first "pro-shareholder" charter may be good: it leads to a high share price and makes the founder wealthy. But if the founder cares passionately how the company is run, the second "pro- management" charter may be good: shareholders will not pay as much for the shares but the founder will have control over the company's future.

當然，政府對公司章程中關于“公開上市階段”部分的監管沒有引起太大爭論。大多數經濟學家和律師都信仰“合約自由”，即應該允許人們起草自己喜歡的合約。不過，當創始人最初起草章程時，他無法預測50年或100年后的世界形勢。套用經濟學家或律師的行話就是，公司章程是“不完整的合約”。

Certainly there does not seem to be a strong argument for government regulation of the corporate charter at the "going public" stage. Most economists and lawyers believe in "freedom of contract": people should be allowed to write the contracts they like. But when the founder writes the initial charter, he cannot predict what the world will look like 50 or 100 years hence. To use the jargon of economists and lawyers, corporate charters are "incomplete contracts".

如何解釋此類章程的問題，最終或許要訴諸法律。當80年代惡意收購浪潮席卷美國時，膽戰心驚的上市公司經理和董事會引入了“毒丸”等反收購新手段，以擊退惡意收購者。但他們的章程允許其使用此類手段嗎？這有待法院裁決。在美國公司治理方面最重要的特拉華州法院裁定，毒藥是合法的。雖然很多人認為這是個錯誤，但法院在填補不完整公司章程的缺口方面，已顯示出重要作用。

Questions about how to interpret such charters may end up before the courts. As hostile takeovers swept the US in the 1980s, scared managers and boards of public companies introduced new techniques, such as the "poison pill", to fight off hostile bidders. But did their charters allow them to use such techniques? It was left to the courts to decide. The Delaware courts, the most important in the US for corporate governance, ruled that poison pills were OK. Many people think this was a mistake. But the courts had demonstrated their important role in filling in the gaps of incomplete corporate charters.

那么，哪些法規是合理的，哪些是不合理的呢？在有一種干預措施中，政府會否決某些章程條款，或要求公司以同原始章程的精神相抵觸的方式，對其進行修改。在另一種干預措施中，法院決定以新的方法解釋公司章程。

So which laws and regulations are good and which are bad? In one type of intervention, the government disallows certain charter provisions or requires corporate charters to be changed in ways that contravene the spirit of the original charter. In the second type of intervention, the courts decide to interpret corporate charters in a new way.

第一種形式類似于要求所有公司章程都是親股東的。這干涉了合約自由，因此是不合理的。第二種則比較有道理。在如何填補不完整公司章程的缺口方面，法院有權酌情處理。或許，當它們想要提高效率時，沒有理由不運用自己的酌處權。

The first type is like requiring all company charters to be pro- shareholder. It interferes with freedom of contract and is bad. The second type makes more sense. Courts have considerable discretion in how they fill in the gaps of incomplete corporate charters and there is no reason for them not to use their discretion as they want, perhaps to enhance efficiency.

這在哪方面脫離了最近的法規制度呢？不論美國的薩班斯－奧克斯利法案(連同證交所的新規定)還是英國的公司治理新法規，其重要目的均在于提高董事的獨立性，減少利益沖突。比如在美國，上市公司的大多數董事必須是獨立的，負責公司審計的事務所不能向該公司提供咨詢服務。在英國，規則是勸誡式而非強制式的，其中一條規則要求，首席執行官不應擔任或繼續擔任董事長。另一條規則要求，大公司董事會的半數成員應是獨立的。

Where does that leave recent laws and regulations? An important aim of both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US (together with new stock exchange rules) and the new code of corporate governance in the UK is to increase directorial independence and reduce conflicts of interest. For example, in the US, a majority of board members of listed companies must be independent and the company's auditors cannot provide consulting services for the company. In the UK, swheresthe rules are exhortatory rather than compulsory, one rule says the chief executive should not be, or go on to be, chairman. A second rule says half the board members of a major company should be independent.

不幸的是，所有這些法規都屬于第一種干預形式的范疇。毫無跡象表明，公司創始人或初期投資者曾經打算對其公司或董事會采取此類限制措施。它們推翻了創始人和投資者自愿達成的協議。這些人均未參與對不完整公司章程的解釋。

Unfortunately, all these regulations fallsintosthe first category of intervention. There is no sign that company founders or initial investors ever intended such restrictions to be placed on their companies or boards. They override agreements enteredsintos voluntarily by founders and investors. None of them involves the interpretation of incomplete corporate charters.

因此，很難說為“修復”安然或帕瑪拉特危機而倉促通過一系列法律是否是個好主意。它們干涉了合約自由，因此很可能會降低效率。另外，它們可能還會增加法律成本、浪費董事會的時間，并嚇退一些公司的未來上市行動。

It is, therefore, far from clear that laws passed hurriedly to "fix" an Enron or a Parmalat crisis are a good idea. They are likely to reduce efficiency because they interfere with freedom of contract. What is more, they are likely to increase legal costs, waste board time and deter future companies from going public.

作者是哈佛大學經濟學教授和倫敦經濟學院客座教授。本文選自作者的拉菲爾＃馬蒂奧里(Raffaele Mattioli)系列講座第一講。

The writer is professor of economics at Harvard University and visiting professor at the London School of Economics. The article is drawn from the writer's first Raffaele Mattioli lecture

譯者/安娜