上月，在邁阿密舉行的美洲自由貿易區(FTAA)部長級會議上，羅伯特•策利克(Robert Zoellick)極力主張的特惠貿易協定遭遇嚴重挫折。

Robert Zoellick's love affair with preferential trade deals suffered a serious setback at last month's ministerial meeting on the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Miami.

    邁阿密會議上拼湊而成的協議，不過是顧全各國顏面的方案罷了。盡管前天美國宣布與四個中美洲國家達成貿易協定，但是，美國貿易代表尋求雙邊及地區協定的策略，顯然仍面臨嚴重的障礙。

The patchwork deal that emerged from Miami was little more than a face-saving formula. Notwithstanding announcement of trade agreements between the US and four Central American nations the day before yesterday, it is clear that the US trade representative's strategy of going for bilateral and regional deals faces serious difficulties.

    因此，盡管在9月份世界貿易組織坎昆會議上，有一些關于多哈回合談判終結的不成熟傳言，但該談判現已重新浮出水面，成為推進國際貿易的重大選擇。在世界貿易體系中，農業是保護主義最根深蒂固的行業。我們認為，如果我們打算在農業貿易自由化上取得更多進步，那么多哈談判不僅是一種選擇，而且必須是唯一的選擇。在本周召開的世貿組織總理事會會議上，各國紛紛表示，將對多哈回合談判提供壓倒一切的政治支持。而更重要的是，這種政治支持應盡快化為各國之間具體的談判。

The consequence is that the Doha round has resurfaced as a serious option for advancing world trade, despite the premature reports of its demise at the Canc鷑 meeting of the World Trade Organisation in September. We would argue that Doha must be seen not just as an option but as the only option if we are to make further progress in liberalising that part of the world trading systemswheresprotectionism is most entrenched: agriculture. That makes it all the more important that the overwhelming political support for the Doha round, expressed at the WTO's general council meeting this week, is translated quicklysintosmeaningful negotiations.

    邁阿密會談之所以失敗，部分原因在于貿易伙伴的選擇、雙邊和地區談判的議程受到了政治干預。對此，策利克先生始終拒絕承認，哪怕美國已經利用雙邊協定來惠顧其忠誠的盟國（如澳大利亞），同時懲罰其薄情的朋友（如新西蘭）。事實上，國內與國際政治已成為貿易自由化的絆腳石。

Part of the reason for the failure of the Miami talks was that politics intrudessintosthe choice of trade partners and the agendas covered by bilaterals and regionals. Mr Zoellick has always refused to admit this, even as the US has used bilateral deals to favour loyal allies (such as Australia) and punish fickle friends (such as New Zealand). The reality is that domestic and international politics create roadblocks to trade liberalisation.

    在美國與墨西哥就北美貿易自由協定(NAFTA)展開談判期間，這一點就就已昭然若著了。許多貿易保護主義者都將矛頭指向墨西哥的問題，而不管這些問題是否與貿易有任何關聯。他們聲稱，與墨西哥進行的自由貿易不會是“公平”貿易。同時，各種非貿易問題也擺上了談判桌，包括墨西哥的環境狀況、勞工標準、知識產權法，及其民主情況。最終，北美自由貿易協定勉強得以幸存，而且自那以后，貿易談判都受到美國游說團體的控制。這些人不論好壞，都打著“貿易”的幌子試圖推進議程。

That was clear during the US negotiations with Mexico over the North American Free Trade Agreement. Many protectionists focused on Mexico's problems, regardless of whether these had anything to do with trade. They alleged that free trade with Mexico would not be "fair" trade. A variety of non-trade issues became part of the talks: the state of Mexico's environment, its labour standards, its intellectual property law and the state of its democracy. In the end Nafta survived, but barely, and trade negotiations since then have been taken prisoner by US lobbies, good and bad, that seek to advance their agendas by pretending that they are "trade-related".

    但美洲自由貿易區遭受的是國際政治之苦。顯然，巴西將美洲自由貿易區視為北美自由貿易協定的延伸，美國仍在其中扮演霸主角色。而巴西傾向于擴展南方共同市場(Mercosur)關稅同盟，因為它在該同盟中占主導地位。在邁阿密會議上，這種政治議程導致巴西與美國及其盟友加拿大和墨西哥相對峙。也許巴西總統盧拉•達席爾瓦(Luiz In醕io Lula da Silva)及其顧問是在對策利克先生2002年的一番話進行報復。當時策利克說，如果達席爾瓦總統反對美洲自由貿易區，他完全可以與南極洲進行貿易。

But the FTAA has been afflicted instead by international politics. Brazil evidently sees it as an extension of Nafta, with the US playing the hegemon. Brazil favours instead an expansion from the Mercosur customs union, which it dominates. At Miami, this political agenda set Brazil against the US and its allies, Canada and Mexico. Perhaps Luiz In醕io Lula da Silva and his advisers were getting their own back on Mr Zoellick for his remark in 2002 that, if he was opposed to the FTAA, the Brazilian president was free to trade with Antarctica.

    但雙邊協議和區域協議的主要問題是，它們完全無法處理取消農業補貼的問題。美國和歐洲都普遍對農業進行補貼，在這種情況下，怎能優先削減農業生產補貼呢？不可能。同時，一國為其自由貿易合作伙伴優先削減出口補貼，這種做法雖然在技術上可行，但在政治上卻行不通。為什么？因為此舉會顛覆特惠貿易協議的政治邏輯。降低自由貿易協定成員國的關稅將削弱非成員國的競爭力，因為非成員國向自由貿易協定國市場出口產品時，仍將面臨關稅。這為簽署自由貿易協定提供了強大動力。但若自由貿易協定成員國削減其出口補貼，那么，非成員國由于維持補貼，在自由貿易協定國市場的競爭力反而會增強。

But the main problem with bilateral and regional deals is that they simply cannot deal with the issue of removing agricultural subsidies. How can production subsidies, which have proliferated in the US and Europe, be cut preferentially? It is impossible. At the same time, cutting export subsidies preferentially for one's free trade association partners, though technically possible, is out of the question politically. Why? Because such a move would turn the political logic of preferential trade deals on its head. Reducing tariffs for members of an FTA lowers the competitiveness of non-members, which continue to face tariffs when they sellsintosFTA markets. That provides a strong incentive to sign FTAs. But if FTA members cut their export subsidies, the competitiveness of non-members, which maintain their subsidies, increases instead in FTA markets.

    具有諷刺意味的是，即使是在世貿組織規則(允許在特定條件下簽署自由貿易協定)的寬松規定之下，美國自己長期以來也一直采取這樣的立場，即自由貿易協定成員國不得將農業等大型部門排除在協定范圍之外。由于存在上文中概述的困難，保護性農業補貼很可能不受自由貿易協定的束縛。因此，若美國尋求簽署自由貿易協定，就與其所持立場的精神并不完全相符。

Ironically, even under the lax discipline of WTO rules - which allow FTAs under specific conditions - the US itself has long taken the position that FTA members should not be allowed to exempt large sectors, such as agriculture, from their ambit. To pursue FTAs - which, owing to the difficulties outlined above, are likely to exempt protectionist agricultural subsidies - is not exactly consistent with the spirit of that position.

    如果全世界的貿易國要反對農業補貼，那么走雙邊之路不僅不明智，而且不現實。多哈回合談判才是必經之路。

If the world's trading nations are to attack agricultural subsidies, going down the bilateral path is not merely unwise; it is also impractical. There is no escaping Doha.

    加迪什•巴格瓦蒂是哥倫比亞大學教授及美國對外關系委員會高級研究員。羅伯特•鮑德溫是威斯康星大學經濟學名譽教授。

Jagdish Bhagwati is university professor at Columbia University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Robert Baldwin is emeritus professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin.

    譯者/江潔