日本經濟已經復蘇。至少樂觀人士是這么看的。不過我們有過類似的經歷，如1992年，1997年和2000年曾出現的短暫復蘇。這足以讓人對當前的復蘇持懷疑態度。但此次復蘇還有更說明問題的地方：之所以出現經濟復蘇，更多的是因為日本沒有推行改革，而不是相反。

The Japanese economy is back. Or so optimists believe. But we have been here before, in the brief recoveries of 1992, 1997 and 2000. That is a good reason for scepticism. But there is something even more telling about this recovery than that: it is happening more because Japan has not reformed than because it has.

    先說好消息：迄今日本已實現了連續七個季度的經濟增長。根據經濟合作與發展組織(OECD)對日本進行的最新經濟調查，國內生產總值(GDP)今年將增長2.7%。明年的增長率將達到1.8%。

Let us start with the good news: the economy has now enjoyed seven successive quarters of economic growth. According to the latest economic survey of Japan from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, gross domestic product is set to rise by 2.7 per cent this year. Next year, growth could be 1.8 per cent.

    本次復蘇的“近因”是傳統性的。2002年，出口增長了8.1%。在進口僅增長2%的情況下，凈出口總值的增量相當于GDP的0.7%，從而抵銷了國內投資的下滑，拉動了適度的經濟增長。進入2003年之后，私人非住宅投資開始激增，預期今年的增長率為10.3%，再加上相當于0.5% GDP的凈出口增量，今年的日本經濟就實現了令人滿意的總體增長。

The proximate causes of this recovery are traditional. In 2002, exports grew by 8.1 per cent. With imports rising by only 2 per cent, net exports increased by 0.7 per cent of GDP. This offset the decline in domestic investment, to generate modest economic growth. Then, in 2003, private non-residential investment picked up sharply, with growth forecast at 10.3 per cent. This has combined with growth in net exports of 0.5 per cent of GDP to deliver satisfactory overall growth.

    我在想，在最近一次對日本東京的訪問中，這樣的論述在當地會遭遇什么反應？答案是“弄糊涂了”。在日本，辯論各方仍與以前一樣觀點迥異：其中包括注重微觀經濟改革的“供應學派”，強調需要對銀行進行資產重組的“銀行學派”，以及由主張增大貨幣發行量的“貨幣學派”和主張增大財政赤字的“財政學派”構成的“需求學派”。但各方(至少在知情者中間)看來都認同兩點：首先，外部環境起了可觀的拉動作用；其次，日本央行已從問題的一部分轉變為解決方案的一部分。

How, I wondered during a recent visit, would this story look in Tokyo? Confused is the answer. The debate remains as divided as before between "supply-siders", who emphasise microeconomic reform, "bank-siders", who emphasise the need to recapitalise the banks, and "demand-siders", split, in turn, between monetarists, who demand more money, and fiscalists, who recommend bigger fiscal deficits. But two points seem to be widely agreed, at least among the insiders: first, the external sector is proving a great boon; second, the Bank of Japan has moved from being part of the problem towards being part of the solution.

    這兩點都是正確的。截至2003年中期的18個月間，日本的出口達到12% 的年增長率，其間有三分之一的出口增量是對以中國為首的亞洲市場的出口。同時，日本央行也一改其前任行長速水優在任期間的推諉搪塞作風。在央行董事會的多數成員預報正數的通脹率之前，其新管理層將堅定奉行零利率和定量寬松銀根政策。

Both points are right. Exports rose at a 12 per cent annual rate during the 18 months through mid-2003. A third of the increase in exports over that period was to Asian markets, led by China. Similarly, the prevarication of the Bank of Japan under Masaru Hayami, its former governor, has gone. Under its new management, the bank is committed to sustaining zero interest rates and quantitative monetary easing until the majority of board members forecast above-zero inflation.

    要治愈日本的疾患，更大的經常帳戶盈余和更積極的貨幣政策都是必要條件。日本需要將其龐大私人儲蓄中的更大一部分出口。它還需要通貨膨脹，籍以減輕國內債務的重負。但迄今為止日本的改革并不到位。

A bigger current account surplus and a more aggressive monetary policy are necessary conditions for ending the Japanese malaise. Japan needs to export more of its surplus private savings. It also needs inflation, to reduce the overhang of domestic debt. But the changes so far are inadequate.

    日本的經常帳戶盈余仍為GDP的大約3%，遠遠不足以在現有私營部門投資水平(且不提均衡狀態)之上吸收多余的私人儲蓄。同樣，要結束自二十世紀九十年代中期以來一直持續的通貨緊縮，貨幣政策還不夠積極。去年，GDP縮減指數 （ 經濟體中價格變動的最廣泛衡量尺度 ） 下降了1.7%。根據OECD的預測，2003年還將再下降2.5%。更有甚者，根據OECD的預報，顯著的產出缺口 ，以及由此形成的持續的通縮壓力 ， 將至少持續到2005年。

The current account surplus is still about 3 per cent of GDP, which is far too small to mop up the country's excess of private savings over current (let alone equilibrium) levels of private investment. Similarly, monetary policy is still not aggressive enough to end the deflation that has been under way since the mid-1990s. The GDP deflator - the broadest measure of price changes in the economy - fell by 1.7 per cent last year. According to the OECD, it is set to fall by another 2.5 per cent in 2003. Moreover, the OECD forecasts a significant output gap - and so persistent deflationary pressure - at least until 2005.

    不過，這些還不是持懷疑態度者的所有依據。認為日本面臨結構性缺陷的人是對的，只不過他們通常不能正確地認清問題，因為這些問題主要是在宏觀經濟而不是微觀經濟層面。最明顯的特點之一就是投資過度的企業界。與歷次復蘇一樣，本次復蘇也是建立在私營部門投資激增的基礎上，因而也同樣是不牢靠的。

These are not the only reasons for doubt, however. Those who argue that the country faces structural handicaps are right. It is just that they usually fail to identify them correctly, since they are more macroeconomic than microeconomic. Among the most significant features is a corporate sector that invests far too much. For this reason the present recovery, which is built, as usual, on a surge in private investment, rests on sand.

    在剖析日本企業界行為的古怪程度方面，沒有人比英國倫敦咨詢機構Smithers & Co的安德魯•史密瑟斯(Andrew Smithers)更為透徹。如圖表所示，日本的企業投資占GDP的份額一向高于美國。但過去十年來美國經濟每年以超過3%多一點的增長率穩步前進，而同期日本經濟僅以略高于1%的年增長率蹣跚而行。

Andrew Smithers, of London-based Smithers & Co, has done more than anybody else to explain how peculiar the behaviour of the Japanese corporate sector is. As the chart shows, the share of corporate investment in Japanese GDP has been consistently higher than in the US. Yet the US economy has been growing at a little over 3 per cent a year over the past 10 years, while Japan's has limped along at just over 1 per cent.

    另一方面，美國的勞動力人數每年增長大約1%，而日本的勞動力人數每年減少0.5%。兩者都使人預期美國的企業投資會大大高于日本。假如這兩個經濟體都同樣具有競爭力，對國際資本市場也同樣開放，情況確實會這樣。但證據顯示實際情況并非如此。

The US labour force is also growing at about 1 per cent a year, while the Japanese labour force is shrinking at 0.5 per cent a year. Both of these are reasons for expecting corporate investment to be substantially higher in the US than in Japan. If both economies were equally competitive and open to international capital markets, that would be the case. The evidence shows they are not.

    由于日本每增產一個GDP單位所需的資本幾乎為美國的三倍，日本的資本回報率顯然低得多，可能還不到美國的一半。假設，按照供應學派的主張，日本整體勞動生產率的增長遠遠快于美國，這個難題也許會迎刃而解。理論上，這種假設并非完全不可能成為現實，因為目前日本工人的每小時產出只達到美國水平的70%。但事實是人們看不到此等復興的絲毫跡象。相反，過去十年來日本勞動生產率的增長幅度一直在下降，目前低于每年2%。

Because it takes almost three times as much capital to produce an additional unit of GDP in Japan as in the US, Japanese returns on capital must be much lower, probably less than half. This might cease to be the case if, as the supply-siders believe, aggregate productivity growth were to rise far more quickly than in the US. That is not inconceivable, since Japan's output per hour is only 70 per cent of US levels. But no sign of such a renaissance can be seen. On the contrary, the growth of labour productivity has been falling in the past decade, to below 2 per cent a year.

    那么，為什么日本企業的投資水平一直居高不下呢？原因之一是，未經改革的日本企業界，依然不把回報股東當一回事。另一個原因是，由于未能理解通縮的影響，對盈利能力的衡量有誤。在通貨緊縮的經濟體中，實際利率高于名義利率。對于負債累累的企業界而言，這會對股本回報率產生重大影響。比如，計入資產價格的變動后，股本回報率竟從正數的5% 變為負數的5% (見圖表)。

Why then does investment remain so stubbornly high? One reason is that the unreformed Japanese corporate sector is indifferent to returns to shareholders. Another is that profitability is mismeasured, because of the failure to understand the implications of deflation. Under deflation, real interest rates are higher than nominal ones. For a highly indebted corporate sector, this makes a huge difference to returns on equity. Adjusted for changes in asset prices, for example, the return on equity moves from plus 5 per cent to minus 5 per cent (see chart).

    這種分析意味著，本次復蘇能夠持續，只不過是因為日本的企業在繼續浪費資本。換句話說，恰恰是因為首相小泉純一郎對“日本公司”的經營束手無策，才造就了當前的投資復蘇。但也正是出于同樣的原因，這樣的復蘇不太可能持久。即使對于受到層層保護，不對資本市場開放的日本企業界來說，損失金錢也不是明智可行的長期出路。

One implication of this analysis is that, to the extent that this recovery lasts, it can only be because Japanese companies continue to waste capital. It is, in other words, only because Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister, has made so little difference to the operations of Japan Inc that an investment-led recovery is under way. But it is unlikely to last, for the same reason. Losing money is not a sound long-run proposition even for a corporate sector as well-shielded from capital markets as the Japanese.

    日本的現狀是一切依然如故。該國正得益于海外經濟增長及其對于自身疾患癥狀的有效管理。這種做法自然沒有治本那么痛苦。但距離治愈的境界，日本一如既往地相距遙遠。

What is happening at the moment is business as usual. Japan is benefiting from growth overseas, together with successful management of the domestic symptoms of its disease. That is certainly less painful than treatment. But Japan is as far from a cure as ever.

    martin.wolf@ft.com

martin.wolf@ft.com

    譯者/和風