穩(wěn)定與增長公約已經(jīng)死亡。對于那些認(rèn)為公約和條約應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)玫阶鹬氐娜藗儊碚f，這是壞消息。但是，該公約走向死亡也說明，協(xié)議應(yīng)當(dāng)是合理的，并且讓人們覺得是符合各國利益的。但穩(wěn)定與增長公約并非如此。

The stability and growth pact is dead. This is bad for those who believe that pacts and treaties should be respected. But its death also shows that agreements should be intelligent and perceived to be in the national interest. This was not the case with the stability and growth pact.

    為什么會出現(xiàn)這種情況呢？穩(wěn)定與增長公約有一個嚴(yán)重的問題：不可維持的政府債務(wù)水平會導(dǎo)致債務(wù)危機(jī)，特別是這種危機(jī)會破壞貨幣聯(lián)盟。有三個國家的債務(wù)比例超過了國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的100％，接近于無法持續(xù)的水平。這三個國家是比利時、意大利和希臘。對于這些國家來說，為了降低債務(wù)水平，使用猛藥是有道理的。公約所開的藥方是，在商業(yè)循環(huán)周期維持平衡預(yù)算，如超過重要的3％赤字規(guī)則便會受到懲罰，該規(guī)則對這些國家來說合適的。但是，同樣的方法對其他國家如法國和德國卻是不恰當(dāng)?shù)摹?/font>

Why did this happen? The pact identified an important problem: unsustainable government debt levels can lead to debt crises, which are especially damaging in a monetary union. Three countries - Belgium, Italy and Greece, with debt ratios exceeding 100 per cent of gross domestic product - came close to unsustainable debt levels. For these countries it made sense to use drastic medicine aimed at reducing the debt levels. For them, the pact's medicine of maintaining a balanced budget over the business cycle and of punishing the trespassers of the magical 3 per cent deficit rule was appropriate. It was not, however, for the others, including France and Germany.

    這些國家的債務(wù)水平適中，用公約的規(guī)則對它們進(jìn)行約束并將強(qiáng)迫它們的債務(wù)比例趨于零，而且當(dāng)赤字超過3％時，威脅對它們予以重罰，這是沒有道理的。該藥是給重病人而不是健康人吃的。

These countries have reasonable debt levels and it did not make sense to subject them to a rule that pushes their debt ratios towards zero, and threaten them with heavy fines when the deficits exceed 3 per cent. This medicine was intended for the critically ill, not for the healthy.

    公約不合理還有另一個原因。現(xiàn)代國家對自己的公民承擔(dān)有許多責(zé)任。在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間，市民期望社會保障機(jī)制發(fā)揮作用，但國家的財力則比較緊張。不靈活的公約對此卻沒有考慮。

The pact was unintelligent for another reason. Modern nations have a lot of responsibilities to their citizens. These responsibilities are stretched during a recession, when citizens expect the social insurance mechanisms to function. The rigidity of the pact was blind to this.

    如果不采取行動，讓該公約原封不動存在，這對于歐洲相當(dāng)不利。該公約將來還會無可避免地遇到問題，導(dǎo)致新的對抗和相互指責(zé)。我們不能不尋求好的出路。

If nothing is done and the pact remains unchanged, it will be very bad for Europe. The pact will inevitably be invoked again in the future, leading to new fights and recriminations. We have to do better.

    新的公約應(yīng)當(dāng)是什么樣的呢？首先，由于各國的債務(wù)水平懸殊很大，因此各國應(yīng)當(dāng)區(qū)別對待。這意味著，那些債務(wù)水平超過國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值100％的國家和那些債務(wù)水平可持續(xù)的國家，應(yīng)當(dāng)遵循不同的預(yù)算政策規(guī)則。不管有病或是健康，原來的穩(wěn)定公約對所有國家用同樣的藥，這樣的方法應(yīng)當(dāng)摒棄。

What should such a new pact look like? First, since countries have very different debt levels, they should all be treated differently. This means that countries whose debt exceeds more than 100 per cent of GDP should follow different budgetary policy rules from countries with sustainable debt levels. The approach of the old stability pact - applying the same medicine to all, sick or healthy - should be abandoned.

    第二，公約應(yīng)當(dāng)更為靈活。要求各國在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間降低社會保障支出責(zé)任的規(guī)則是難以維持的，即因為加入貨幣聯(lián)盟，各國政府已經(jīng)失去了一種政策工具。

Second, the pact should have more flexibility. A rule that requires countries to lower their social security responsibilities during recessions will not last because, in a monetary union, governments have lost an instrument of policy.

    我們應(yīng)當(dāng)怎樣來貫徹這些原則呢？在新公約中，各國將界定它們認(rèn)為是合理的債務(wù)水平。這種水平將不會使它們陷入債務(wù)危機(jī)。雖然這應(yīng)當(dāng)留給成員國自己決定，但是，新公約將設(shè)定一個上限，像在《馬約》(Treaty of Maastrich)中規(guī)定的那樣，也許可以定為國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的60％。在商業(yè)周期循環(huán)中，每個國家將以這個債務(wù)水平為目標(biāo)，上下允許一些靈活性。

How should we implement these principles? In the new pact, countries would define the debt levels that they found appropriate; and that will not lead themsintosa debt crisis. This should be a national decision but the new pact would define a maximum, which might or might not be 60 per cent, as in the treaty of Maastricht. Individual countries would then target this debt level over the business cycle, allowing for some flexibility on both sides.

    讓我們舉例來說明。假定參加新公約的一個國家把債務(wù)與GDP比例定為50％。這與穩(wěn)定公約當(dāng)前設(shè)定的零目標(biāo)完全不同。本例子的計算表明，該國可以每年平均維持2％的預(yù)算赤字（假設(shè)GDP名義年增長率為4％），將不會危險地接近50％的目標(biāo)。

Let us take an example. Suppose that in a new pact a country targets a 50 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio, which is very different from the present 0 per cent target imposed by the stability pact. The arithmetic of this example then implies that this country can maintain a budget deficit of 2 per cent a year on average (assuming that the nominal growth of GDP is 4 per cent a year), without endangering the 50 per cent debt target.

    在這個公約中，3％的赤字上限規(guī)則是不適用的。這個規(guī)定過于靈活。每次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，各國都可能觸及上限，導(dǎo)致危機(jī)。一般說來，應(yīng)當(dāng)避免使用預(yù)算赤字的數(shù)字規(guī)定。一個民主選舉產(chǎn)生的政府面臨來自其市民的許多申請和要求，在這種情況下，數(shù)字規(guī)則缺乏可信度。

In such a pact the 3 per cent maximum deficit rule cannot apply. It is far too inflexible. With each recession, countries would hit the ceiling and a crisis would arise. In general, numerical rules for the budget deficits should be avoided. They have no credibility in a worldswheres democratically elected governments face the many claims and aspirations of their citizens.

    在新公約中，不會發(fā)生嚴(yán)重罰款和懲罰。如同數(shù)字規(guī)定一樣，罰款和懲罰沒有可信度。相反，應(yīng)當(dāng)通過權(quán)威機(jī)構(gòu)的壓力來實行相互控制。有的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家建議，建立一個獨立的官方監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)，按照宣布的預(yù)算目標(biāo)，對各國的預(yù)算政策進(jìn)行評估。這看來是個好主意。

In a new pact, there would be no place for heavy fines and penalties. Like the numerical rules, fines and penalties have no credibility. Instead, mutual control should be exerted by peer pressure. Some economists have proposed the creation of an official and independent watchdog that would evaluate the budget policies in the light of the announced debt targets. This seems like a good idea.

    現(xiàn)在是放棄舊公約的時候了，我們需要制定一個新的公約，該公約兼顧債務(wù)可持續(xù)性和現(xiàn)代國家靈活地對經(jīng)濟(jì)波動作出反應(yīng)的需要。我們有機(jī)會創(chuàng)造一個新的公約。我們再也不能繼續(xù)讓舊公約主導(dǎo)我們的生活，如果不對它進(jìn)行更新，它將會屢屢成為我們未來沖突的根源。

This is the time to abandon the old pact and build a new one that reconciles the need for debt sustainability and the desire of modern nations to react flexibly to economic disturbances. We have an opportunity to create such a pact. We cannot afford to live with the old pact, which, if resuscitated, will be a constant source of conflict in the future.

    作者是魯文大學(xué)（University of Leuven）經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授。

The writer is professor of economics at the University of Leuven

    譯者/秋實