人民幣浮動(dòng)還是不浮動(dòng),這是一個(gè)問題。更精確地說,這是其中一個(gè)問題。中國(guó)政府也可以將人民幣與美元在更高的水平掛鉤。最近對(duì)中國(guó)的訪問使我相信,中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在近期無意改變他們視為成功的機(jī)制。但是,該機(jī)制也不會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)不變。什么時(shí)候會(huì)變?又怎么樣變呢?
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To
float or not to float, that is the question. To be more precise, it is one
of the questions. The Chinese authorities could also repeg the renminbi at
a higher rate. My recent visit has convinced me that the leadership will
not change what they see as a successful regime in the near future. But it
will also not last forever. When and how might it change?
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自從中國(guó)似乎有意無限制地累積外匯儲(chǔ)備以來,中國(guó)的貿(mào)易伙伴能夠影響中國(guó)的手段便是有限的。這是中國(guó)要按照自己的條件進(jìn)行的決策。然而,起點(diǎn)必須是,判斷中國(guó)的貨幣是不是低估。許多美國(guó)人以美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)龐大且日益增加的雙邊貿(mào)易赤字為由,自然而然得出肯定的答案。但是,這不能說明什么問題。重要的是要看總體收支平衡狀況。
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Since
the Chinese seem willing to accumulate foreign currency reserves without
limit, the leverage of its partners is limited. This is a decision China
will make, on its own terms. Nevertheless, the starting point must be
whether the currency is undervalued. Many Americans assume it is, pointing
to their country's vast, and growing, bilateral trade deficits. But these
tell us nothing. What matters is the overall balance of payments.
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在過去7年中,中國(guó)每年的經(jīng)常帳戶盈余為100億至400億美元。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織預(yù)測(cè),今年的盈余為250億美元,比國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的2%略低*。但是中國(guó)也經(jīng)歷著巨額外國(guó)直接投資凈流入。如果把兩方面匯總,今年的盈余將不低于國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的5%。
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Over
the past seven years, China has been running current account surpluses of
about bn to bn a year (see chart). The International Monetary Fund
forecasts the surplus this year at bn, a little under 2 per cent of
gross domestic product.* But China also has a huge net inflow of foreign
direct investment. If one takes the sum of these two elements, the surplus
this year will be a good 5 per cent of GDP.
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但是,在2001年之前,中國(guó)的資本帳戶各項(xiàng)保持進(jìn)出平衡。因此,總體來看,中國(guó)沒有積累很大的外匯儲(chǔ)備。但是,現(xiàn)在情況已經(jīng)改變。平衡的資本流出,已經(jīng)變?yōu)榫揞~資本流入。從2000年底至2003年9月,外匯儲(chǔ)備增加2180億美元。
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Until
2001, however, China also had a balancing outflow in the rest of its
capital account. Overall, therefore, the country did not accumulate
substantial foreign currency reserves. But this has changed. The balancing
capital outflow has become a huge inflow. Between the end of 2000 and
September 2003, foreign currency reserves rose by bn.
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在2001年之前,經(jīng)常帳戶盈余和外國(guó)直接投資至少被其他資本流出所抵消。人民幣沒有被低估。自從那時(shí)以來,人民幣面臨很強(qiáng)的升值壓力,當(dāng)然大部分可能具有投機(jī)性。總體而言,國(guó)際貨幣基金組織董事會(huì)得出結(jié)論:“沒有任何明確的證據(jù)顯示,眼下人民幣是被大幅低估了。”
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At
least until 2001, surpluses on the current account and FDI were offset by
other capital outflows. The currency was not undervalued. Strong upward
pressure has emerged since then, but much of this may be speculative. On
balance, the IMF's board of directors has concluded "that there is no
clear evidence that the renminbi is substantially undervalued".
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然而,通過逆推的方法,肯定可以獲得兩個(gè)結(jié)果。第一,全球收支現(xiàn)在嚴(yán)重失衡,美國(guó)經(jīng)常帳戶赤字被其他國(guó)家的盈余抵消。人民幣實(shí)際升值必然是全球調(diào)整的要素。第二,以美元計(jì)價(jià)的中國(guó)出口產(chǎn)品價(jià)格正在降低。如果其他許多國(guó)家貨幣對(duì)美元升值(人民幣也不例外),用人民幣計(jì)價(jià)的大多數(shù)制造業(yè)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格也將下降。這將會(huì)支持中國(guó)正在出口通貨緊縮的指控。相反,如果中國(guó)出口產(chǎn)品的美元價(jià)格上升,將更為理想。
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Nevertheless,
two offsetting points must be made. The first is that global payments are
significantly out of balance, with a huge US current account deficit
offset by surpluses elsewhere. A real appreciation of the renminbi must be
a necessary element in global adjustment. The second point is that the
prices of China's exports are falling, in dollars. If many of the world's
currencies appreciate against the dollar (and so also the renminbi),
prices of a wide range of manufactures must fall in their domestic
currencies. That would strengthen the charge that China is exporting
deflation. It would be better if, instead, the dollar prices of China's
exports were rising.
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我的結(jié)論是,要求中國(guó)實(shí)際匯率升值,從全球的視野來看,是有道理的。但是,就中國(guó)人的觀點(diǎn)來說,情況完全不同。中國(guó)的觀點(diǎn)是,人民幣盯住美元有許多有利之處:可以保持出口和香港市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定。香港的貨幣也與美元掛鉤;并且在此框架內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)作一向很好。
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My
conclusion is that the case for an appreciation of the Chinese real
exchange rate has merit, from a global perspective. But the argument looks
very different to the Chinese themselves. For them, the dollar peg has
many advantages: it provides stability for both exporters and Hong Kong,
whose currency is also pegged to the dollar; and it has given a framework
in which the economy has performed excellently.
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更重要的是,允許人民幣升值會(huì)產(chǎn)生諸多不利影響。升值代表著對(duì)美國(guó)政府和投機(jī)者壓力的屈服;在中國(guó)這個(gè)通貨膨脹本來就已經(jīng)很低的國(guó)家,升值將降低貿(mào)易商品的國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格,對(duì)農(nóng)民的打擊尤其嚴(yán)重;升值也可能暴露中國(guó)公司資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表存在很大問題。
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More
important, the disadvantages of allowing the currency to appreciate are
significant. It would represent a concession to pressure from the US
authorities and speculators; it would lower domestic prices of tradeable
goods in a country that already has very low inflation, with particularly
severe effects on farmers; and it might reveal substantial weaknesses in
the balance sheets of Chinese businesses.
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也很難說什么是可供選擇的正確機(jī)制。如果將人民幣在較高水平盯住美元,投資者很可能再次發(fā)起攻擊。如果將人民幣浮動(dòng),有可能調(diào)整過頭。在存在外匯管制的情況下,公司也將難以回避外匯風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。而解除外匯管制將使面臨倒閉和管理不善的金融機(jī)構(gòu)受全球資本市場(chǎng)的左右。
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It
is also unclear what the right alternative regime would be. If the
currency were repegged at a higher rate, speculators might well try again.
If it were floated, it might overshoot. In the presence of exchange
controls, it would also be difficult for companies to hedge foreign
currency risk. But lifting exchange controls would expose bankrupt and
ill-managed financial institutions to the temptations of the global
capital markets.
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所有這些都是不考慮變更政策的令人信服的原因。但是,變更也是有理由的:當(dāng)前外匯儲(chǔ)備的累積對(duì)貨幣供應(yīng)造成嚴(yán)重后果。今年貨幣和信貸發(fā)行的增加大大超過名義國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的增長(zhǎng)。這意味著現(xiàn)在的過度投資,將成為未來更多的不良貸款。但在目前,對(duì)此表示擔(dān)憂的觀點(diǎn)并不占多數(shù)。部分原因是,當(dāng)局相信,信貸增長(zhǎng)正在得到控制。再者,政府傾向于高增長(zhǎng)率。還有就是中國(guó)眼下不存在通脹。較高的通貨膨脹甚至有助于降低金融系統(tǒng)的大規(guī)模壞帳。
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All
these seem cogent reasons not to consider changing policy. But there is
also a reason to do so: the monetary consequences of current reserve
accumulation. Money and credit have been growing far faster than nominal
GDP this year. That means excessive investment now and still more
non-performing loans in the years to come. Yet even this is not an
overwhelming worry, at present. That is partly because the authorities
believe they are bringing credit growth under control, partly because the
government welcomes the high growth and partly because inflation is
non-existent. Somewhat higher inflation could even be a helpful way to
lower the mountain of bad debt in the financial system.
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結(jié)論是,中國(guó)當(dāng)局將不會(huì)很快改變政策。相反,短期的目標(biāo)將是減壓。這些政策可以而且的確已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生效果。包括進(jìn)一步放松資本流出和進(jìn)口限制,以及到國(guó)外進(jìn)行采購(gòu)的特別計(jì)劃。所有這些都有實(shí)際意義。
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The
conclusion is that the authorities will not change policy soon. In the
short term, the aim, instead, will be to lower the pressure. Policies can
- indeed, already do - include further liberalisation of capital outflow
and imports, along with special programmes to buy goods abroad. All this
makes practical sense.
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從中期來看,最好也是最有可能采取的政策是過渡到嚴(yán)格管理的浮動(dòng),而不是對(duì)盯住匯率向上進(jìn)行調(diào)整。這樣的浮動(dòng)甚至與外匯管制沒有矛盾,正如印度的例子所表明的那樣。可以通過擴(kuò)大浮動(dòng)區(qū)間或過渡到盯住不規(guī)定幣種的一攬子貨幣來實(shí)現(xiàn)浮動(dòng)。這種制度的重要特征是更大的匯率不確定性。當(dāng)局隨時(shí)可以推高美元對(duì)人民幣匯率,從而增加不確定性。
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In
the medium term, the best and most likely policy would be a move to a
heavily managed float, rather than an upward adjustment of the peg. Such a
float is even compatible with exchange controls, as the Indian example has
shown. The float can be achieved by widening the bands or moving to an
unspecified currency basket. The important feature of such a system would
be greater exchange rate uncertainty. The authorities could increase that
uncertainty by driving the dollar back up against the renminbi from time
to time.
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但是,中國(guó)的長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)是完全取消匯率控制,使人民幣成為自由浮動(dòng)的貨幣,和建立一個(gè)實(shí)行通貨膨脹目標(biāo)制的中央銀行。但是,這也要求一個(gè)有效并監(jiān)管制度完善的金融體系。現(xiàn)實(shí)的猜測(cè)是,要實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo),至少要到下個(gè)十年的開始甚至更晚的時(shí)間。
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In
the long term, however, China will want full liberalisation of exchange
controls, a freely floating currency and an inflation-targeting central
bank. But this would also require an efficient and well-regulated
financial system. A good guess is that this will not happen before the
beginning of the next decade, or even later.
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管理由目前的人民幣向未來世界貨幣的轉(zhuǎn)化,是一個(gè)富有極大挑戰(zhàn)性的任務(wù)。在眼下不可能發(fā)生重大的政策變革。目前中國(guó)當(dāng)局應(yīng)當(dāng)積極地采取措施,放松進(jìn)口和資本流動(dòng)限制,同時(shí)在不久的將來,過渡到更靈活的匯率制度。中國(guó)跳出單純累積外匯儲(chǔ)備的圈子越早,對(duì)中國(guó)本身和對(duì)國(guó)際收支體系來說,也將越好。*國(guó)際貨幣基金組織結(jié)束與中華人民共和國(guó)的2003
年第四條磋商,2003年11月18日,見www.imf.org
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Managing
the transition of the renminbi to its prospective role as a world currency
is a huge challenge. Large changes in policy cannot be expected right now.
But the Chinese authorities should be liberalising imports and capital
outflow aggressively, while moving, in the reasonably near future, to a
more flexible exchange rate. The sooner the Chinese escape from their
reserve-accumulation treadmill, the better off both they - and the world
payments system - will be. * IMF Concludes 2003 Article IV Consultation
with the People's Republic of China, November 18 2003, www.imf.org. xref
martin.wolf@ft.com
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martin.wolf@ft.com
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譯者/秋實(shí)
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